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ABSTRACT

Negotiation and Autonomy in a
Fast Food Restaurant
by
Eric Orion Silva
Dr. Ronald W. Smith, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Sociology
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

This study is an attempt to apply the negotiated order perspective to the analysis of
the lived experience of workers in two franchised fast food restaurants. Drawing
primarily on the work of Anselm Strauss (1978) and D.H.J. Morgan (1975), I have
examined data taken from auto-ethnographic and overt observation. I found that workers
in different negotiation contexts would use implicit and explicit negotiation to achieve
internal and external goals. Worker’s negotiation strategies depended on the actor’s
individual proclivities and their interpretation o f the negotiation context. Issues subject to
negotiation included wages, the schedule, the amount o f effort expended, and the
definition of deviance. Employees may occupy core or peripheral status within the
restaurant, and their status relates to what types o f goals may be achieved within the
setting. Autonomy may become a bargaining piece in the ongoing negotiations, with
employees and franchisees often trading autonomy for wages or number o f hours.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
The analytical line between process and structure divides sociologists. Decades of
systematic social scientific inquiry have failed to elucidate the line between agency and
structure. Structural functionalists have tended to focus on the deterministic affects of
social structure, while ignoring human agency. Symbolic interactionists have been
accused of placing too much emphasis on human agency and ignoring structural forces
(Maines 1977; Strauss 1978). Because formal organizations are one nexus between micro
and macro realities, they provide an optimal site to study the interplay between the
individual and society (Hall 1999). This particular investigation will consider the agency
o f workers in fast food restaurants. If anyone is trapped in Max Weber’s “Iron Cage” o f
rationalization, it is the stereotypical image o f the fast food worker, mindlessly pressing
cash register buttons with pictures o f sandwiches in place o f numbers and mouthing
scripts (“Would you like fries with that?”). The freedom or autonomy that can exist in
this milieu may have implications for the notion o f human freedom in other rationalized
environments.
Ronald Smith has noted that functionalists focus on the structure o f organizations,
while other sociologists focus “on the organizational member and on the way that
individual feelings impinge on organizational life” (1984:101). Like Smith, this study
will approach organizational life from an actor’s perspective. By taking individual
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motivations, rational and nonrational, alike into consideration we may improve our
understanding o f individual freedom in organizations. The analysis will consider relevant
structural features, which include economic forces (i.e. the unemployment rate), cultural
norms and laws (i.e. racism and board of health regulations).
The lived experience o f fast food workers will be analyzed from the negotiated order
perspective, first developed by Anselm Straus et al. (1963). The negotiated order
perspective, which draws on the assumptions of symbolic interactionism, offers a means
to understand the interaction between structure and agency. Although the negotiated
order perspective may be used to analyze social order at the micro and macro levels, its
practitioners have tended to study organizations (Maines 1977). Studies in negotiated
order demonstrate how social order is maintained through interaction. Oftentimes, the
perspective has been used to analyze how individual autonomy is created and preserved
in an organization (Maines 1977). This perspective, which can demonstrate the existence
and limitations o f agency in a restrictive organization, has been ignored in the literature
concerning fast food workers.
In this study, I am exploring the lived experience o f workers in franchised fast food
restaurants. Restaurant workers are defined as employees that receive a relatively low
hourly wage and whose primary tasks are customer service, food preparation, and
sanitation. For the purposes o f this research, franchised fast food restaurants have the
following features. First, they are one of a chain or number o f restaurants, operated by
different franchisees, offering similar menus and décor, which have been decided upon
by a single franchisor. Second, a franchisor has created a formally rational system for the
scientific management of the labor process, which reduces labor costs, as well as meal
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cost and food preparation time. Third, to paraphrase a portion o f Robert Emerson’s
definition of fast food, customers order from a counter or drive-through window
(1979:53). The franchisor is the individual or group that creates and maintains the
standards of operation for a given chain o f restaurants. The fi-anchisee(s) is the individual
or individuals who operate(s) a fi-anchised restaurant according to a rationalized plan. In
my analysis, I will describe my observations fi-om two, franchised fast food restaurants,
that I will name Anna’s and Grinders.'
Goals o f the Study
In this study, auto-ethnographic and participant observational data is analyzed from
the negotiated order perspective. In doing so. I have four main objectives. The first goal
is to describe the processes of negotiation that occur in a fast food restaurant, and
particularly the processes whereby workers attempt to achieve their personal ends. The
negotiated order perspective is relatively undeveloped (Strauss 1978). This study will
further improve the negotiated order perspective by reworking the existing sensitizing
concepts and expanding the perspective to a new milieu. This research improves our
understanding of highly restricted social orders with the negotiated order perspective. The
second goal is to understand the nature o f autonomy in a rationalized environment. How
and under what circumstances will workers increase their autonomy? The third goal o f
the study is to expand the negotiated order perspective. The fourth aim o f the study is to
expand the substantive understanding o f fast food restaurants. There are a number o f
ethnographic studies o f fast food restaurants, however they tend to focus on restaurants

' The names o f both restaurants and all individuals (except for my own) have been changed.
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that have large highly differentiated crews. By examining fast food restaurants that have
smaller and less complex crews 1 hope to offer a useful contrast to the existing research.
The first research question is “How do low-level fast food restaurant workers achieve
their goals?” To understand how workers in an increasingly rationalized world are able to
achieve their ends despite limited power, I describe the various types o f individuals who
influence the social order. Next, I provide a typology o f possible issues that workers
negotiate for in a fast food restaurant as well as an explanation o f how the structural
features o f the environment impinged on the negotiations.
The second set o f research questions involves an attempt to understand how the
negotiated order perspective is used to understand highly rationalized work places. As the
service sector o f the North American economy continues to expand and become
rationalized, it is increasingly important for scholars to understand the ramifications o f
these changes (Ritzer 1993). Although, the factory continues to be an important site o f
sociological inquiry, sociologists who are interested in understanding how workers are
able to use their agency to create autonomous spaces in the face o f scientific management
should also look to the service sector o f the economy. This study seeks to develop the
negotiated order perspective to aid in that effort.
The third purpose o f this research is to increase sociological understanding of
individual autonomy in highly regulated settings. Fast food restaurants, like factories, are
governed by a strict formal rationality that attempts to control workers through scientific
management. Not surprisingly, the goals o f employers often differ from the goals o f fast
food workers (Leidner 1993; Royle 2000). While a number of researchers have
considered the nature o f autonomy in fast food restaurants, none have applied the
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negotiated order perspective to this endeavor (Garson 1988; Reiter 1991; Leidner 1993;
Newman 1999; Royle 2000; Tannock 2001). Moreover, those who have used the
negotiated order perspective have tended to analyze milieus that clearly demonstrate
issues o f negotiation (for instance Strauss et al. 1981; Hall and Hall 1982; Kleinman
1982; Levy 1982; Spencer 1993). These sociologists have focused heavily on
professionals and how they achieve their shared and divergent goals through interaction.
In as much as these studies are helpful in demonstrating how social order is maintained
through interaction, they collectively ignore social situations that are less readily
amenable to the existing analytical tools o f negotiated order. However, the negotiated
order perspective is founded on the notion that “A social order-even the most repressivewithout some forms o f negotiation would be inconceivable” (Strauss 1978:ix). Therefore,
the negotiated order perspective may be used to examine the most oppressive
environments, so it is necessary to study how processes o f negotiation affect the social
order of settings that are rigidly defined.
Fast food restaurants present an appropriate challenge to a researcher who wants to
understand how people may have limited freedom in seemingly restricted environments.
Simply delineating autonomy, defined as “the absence o f external constraint” is not the
end goal o f this research, rather; it is to understand how workers are able to achieve their
own goals when they are at variance with those o f management (Katz 1968:4). The
degree to which workers are successful at achieving goals that are in conflict with
managerial goals is dependent on their autonomy. Workers will be successful at
achieving goals that are at variance with management to the extent to which they are not
controlled by management. Conversely, when workers’ goals are in line with managerial
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goals, or where their goals are dependent upon the achievement o f managerial goals,
workers may choose not to negotiate for autonomy.
The fourth objective o f the research is to improve the already thorough sociological
literature on fast food restaurants. The existing ethnographic studies o f fast food
restaurants and workers have focused on restaurants that are similar to McDonald’s
(Garson 1988; Reiter 1991; Leidner 1993; Newman 1999; Royle 2001; Tannock 2001).
McDonald’s, although highly recognized, is not the only form that fast food restaurants
may take. Owing to differences in investment capital, menu, and volume o f business,
there are thousands of fast food restaurants that are organized differently from
McDonald’s and Burger King. These restaurants, while similar in terms o f
rationalization, differ in terms o f crew size and differentiation or division o f labor. There
is a considerable diversity in franchised fast food restaurants. This diversity exists within
and between different chains. Some restaurants are franchisees, while others are company
owned. Some restaurants are highly differentiated and have large crews, while others
have a simple division o f labor and have very small crews (Eberts and Gisler 1989).
Although I am assuming that the social order o f all fast food restaurants is based on
implicit and explicit negotiation, I expect that negotiations will be much easier to observe
at smaller, less highly differentiated franchised restaurants. The greater structural
autonomy of franchisees and employees in less complex restaurants allows an observer to
more readily understand the workplace interactions. Although, there are thousands fast
food restaurants in the United States that meet this description, they are largely ignored in
current discourse over fast food restaurants. This study will consider two franchisees that
tend to have a more simplistic structure. The variable crew size and worker specialization
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contributes to differences in the lived experience o f fast food workers. This study will
add to the existing literature, which does not account for these differences.
Study Overview
In chapter two, I will present a review o f the scientific literature. The relevance o f the
processes o f rationalization and scientific management to the study will be examined.
Fast food restaurants are based on a scientific management o f workers, where
management seeks to control most workers’ acts, consequently reducing their autonomy.
Workers who attempt to achieve their goals often have to negotiate for increased
autonomy to do so. Then I will explain the negotiated order perspective and how it may
be used to examine fast food restaurants by discussing the perspective in relation to
existing ethnographic literature. In chapter three, I will describe the methodology
employed in the study. I discuss my decision to use auto-ethnographic and observational
data and the selection of settings. Lastly, 1 consider the ethical issues that are pertinent to
the study. In chapter four, the data will be presented and analyzed from the negotiated
order perspective. First, the two franchises and the individuals who are involved in
negotiations are described. Next, the aspects o f negotiations in fast food restaurants are
explained. Lastly, a typology o f issues that may be negotiated for by workers is
presented. In chapter five, the study is brought to a conclusion. I review the findings in
the analysis chapter, assess the study’s achievements, and discuss how we may generalize
from the findings.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter will review ethnographic literature on fast food workers. 1 will present
some o f the findings o f these researchers to show how issues o f negotiation relate to fast
food work. Before reviewing ethnographic literature, this chapter will review the work o f
Weber, Harry Braverman, and George Ritzer who theorize about the reduction o f worker
autonomy. While the ethnographers demonstrate the lived experience o f workers, Weber,
Ritzer, and Braverman place the experiences o f workers within the context of
rationalization. This chapter will show how the negotiated order perspective might better
exhibit how workers are able to resist formal rational job designs as well as the
limitations of worker agency.
Rationalization, Deskilling, and the
Fast Food Restaurant
Weber, writing at the turn of the century, explained how the western world was
increasingly becoming rationalized. In the 1970s, Braverman argued that employers
deskill jobs to further control and marginalize their employees. More recently, Ritzer has
reasoned that the process of rationalization is continuing to dominate a globalized society
and that rationalization is now exemplified by the rise o f the fast food restaurant. All
three theorists argue that the boundaries o f human freedom or autonomy have been
substantially restricted.
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The Iron Cage of Formal Rationality
A sociological consideration o f rationalized food service must begin with Weber
whose ideal type of bureaucracy exemplifies how the Western world is increasingly
becoming governed by formally rational social action. Weber feared that society would
become trapped in an “Iron Cage” o f rationality (1997:181). Generations o f sociologists
have been concerned with the accuracy o f this grim prediction. Rationalization refers to
the expansion of a particular type o f rationality, namely formal rationality. George Ritzer
explains Weber’s use of the term:
formal rationality means that the search by people for the
optimum means to a given end is shaped by rules,
regulations, and larger social structures. Thus, individuals
are not left to their own devices in searching for the best
means of attaining a given objective. Rather, there exist
rules, regulations, and structures that either predetermine or
help them discover the optimum methods (emphasis in
original) (1993:19).
O f course, the best means to a given end may not be the best means for everyone.
Procedures that may be the best for some may not meet the goals o f others. According to
Weber, rationalization with its emphasis on calculability, technical understanding, and
formal rules has increasingly come to rule social life. The emphasis on using scientific
principles to order the economic world leads to a replacement o f moral relations by
market relations (Schroeder 1992:124). Rationalization has encouraged people to view
each other in terms of their economic relation to one another not in terms o f their
common humanity as dictated to them by the increasingly disavowed religious
institutions.
Rationalization, according to Weber, is taking place in ail spheres o f Western society.
In the economic sphere, “rationalization involved the organization of commercial
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practices by means of technical rules calculated to produce profits by the use o f rational
accounting methods” (Morrison 1995:218). Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills note:
Even so ‘inward’ and apparently subjective an area of
experience as that o f music lends itself to a sociological
treatment under Weber’s concept o f ‘rationalization.’ The
fixation o f clang patterns, by a more concise notation and
the
establishment of the well-tempered
scales;
‘harmonious’ tonal music and the standardization of the
quartet o f woodwinds and string instruments as the core o f
the symphony orchestra (1946:51).
For Weber, the emergence of bureaucracy with its highly rationalized form of
administration is the quintessential example of how social life has become rationalized.
Weber constructed a picture o f what an “ideal” bureaucracy would look like. The salient
features of the bureaucracy include: a high division o f labor, hierarchical structure,
codified employee roles, impersonal and impartial social relations, and lastly,
appointment and promotion is based on technical competence (1946:196-198). The
results of bureaucratization are routinization, impersonality, and the general restriction of
idiosyncratic behavior. In short, rationalization not only reduces individual autonomy; it
destroys the creative agency o f the individual actor.
Weber recognizes both positive and negative aspects o f rationality. It is positive in
that it allows for greater precision, objectivity, and calculability. The impersonality o f
bureaucracies allows them to operate “without regard for persons” (1946:215). Weber
writes, “Bureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through
the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective
considerations” (1946:215). Lastly, bureaucratic administration manipulates actions
along “calculable rules.” Weber writes, “The peculiarity o f modem culture, and
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specifically o f its technical and economic basis, demands this very ‘calculability’ o f
results” (1946:215).
Despite the benefits afforded by bureaucracy, W eber was very mindful o f the
downside of bureaucratization. For Weber, the bureaucracy exemplified the impending
Iron Cage of rationality that may come to descend upon individuals in the modem world.
He writes, “Once it is fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures
which are hardest to destroy” (1946:228). The permanency of the bureaucracy may be
deleterious for those who are subsumed within its structure. Weber states
The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the
apparatus in which he is harnessed. In contrast to the
honorific or avocational ‘notable’ the professional
bureaucrat is chained to his activity by his entire material
and ideal existence. In the great majority of cases, he is
only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which
prescribes to him an essentially fixed route o f march”
(1946:228).
Weber uses the “ideal type” of bureaucracy to illustrate how rationalization might
reduce human agency. In the concluding paragraphs o f the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
o f Capitalism, Weber wams against a possible future where all aspects o f life have
become rationalized, a world where people's roles are locked into an iron cage inhabited
by “specialists without spirit, and sensualists with out heart” ([1930] 1997:182).
Scientific Management and the
Degradation o f Labor
Braverman, in Labor and Monopoly Capital, explains how capitalists have come to
bring about the “division of labor in the workshop” which, occurs when job tasks are
analyzed and dissected into small parts (1974:75). These parts are then assigned to
different workers. The division of crafts, performed by skilled craftsmen into tasks
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performed by many unskilled workers significantly reduces the cost o f production. This
division is only worthwhile however when production is high (1975). Consequently,
skills are “destroyed” for most workers, while those “relatively few persons for whom
special knowledge and training are reserved are freed so far as possible from the
obligations o f simple labor. In this way, a structure is given to all labor processes that at
its extremes polarizes those whose time is infinitely valuable and those whose time is
worth almost nothing” (Braverman 1974:82-83).
Braverman describes how scientific management has succeeded in brining about this
division of labor. Fredrick Taylor, the father o f scientific management, was an innovator
in managerial control, as he was the first to assert “as an absolute necessity fo r adequate
management the dictation to the worker o f the precise manner in which work is to be
performed" (emphasis in original) (1975:90). Additionally, Taylor redefined the notion o f
‘a fair day’s work’ to “all the work a worker can do without injury to his health, at a pace
that can be sustained throughout a working lifetime” (Braverman 1974:97). Braverman
summarizes Taylor’s thought:
So long as [workers] retain their grip on the labor process
itself, they will thwart efforts to realize to the full the
potential inherent in their labor power. To change this
situation, control over the labor process must pass into the
hands o f management, not only in a formal sense but by the
control and dictation o f each step in the process, including
its mode of performance (1975:100).
Scientific management is based on three principles. First, is the separation of the
knowledge o f how to perform a task from the act of performing a task (Braverman:
1974:113). Second, management should be in possession o f the knowledge of the labor
process; this knowledge should be transmitted to workers on a ‘need to know’ basis
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(Braverman 1974). The third principle is “the use o f this monopoly over knowledge to
control each step o f the labor process and its mode o f execution” (Braverman 1974:119).
Scientific management is the vehicle for the formal rational control o f the capitalists.
Braverman provides a detailed discussion o f the effects o f Taylor’s scientific
management. He writes, “The physical processes o f production are now carried out more
or less blindly, not only by the workers who perform them, but often by lower ranks of
supervisory employees as well. The production units operate like a hand, watched,
corrected, and controlled by a distant brain” (1974:125). Braverman is continuing the
Marxian argument that capitalism serves to dehumanize and devalue workers, culturally
and economically. He explains how workers who had previously developed their minds
are slowly stripped of their intellectual faculties. Braverman reports:
the craft provided a daily link between science and work,
since the craftsman was constantly called upon to use
rudimentary scientific knowledge, mathematics, drawing,
etc., in his practice. Such craftsmen were an important part
o f the scientific public of their time, and as a mle exhibited
an interest in science and culture beyond that connected
directly to their work (1974:135).
However, as scientific management denuded workers of their skill, they lost their desire
for higher learning. Scientific management has destroyed the autonomy that they had
previously possessed. Braverman relates the anger of one pundit sympathetic to the plight
of workers during the Tayloristic revolution in the 1910s “the worker is no longer a
craftsman in any sense, but is an animated tool o f the management” (quoted in
Braverman 1974:136). When the process o f rationalization described by Weber was
applied to the labor process as scientific management, the result was the devolution o f the
working class.
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McDonaldization
Weber, who died shortly before White Castle restaurants came to prominence in the
1920s (Jakle and Sculle 1999), never publicly wrote about the rationalization o f food
service. However, his elucidation o f the process o f rationalization in Western society
clearly informs contemporary research on the subject. Seventy years after Weber’s death,
and nearly two decades after Labor and Monopoly Capital, Ritzer, in his widely popular
book. The McDonaldization o f Society, claims that the process o f rationalization is very
much in full force, and that even the sphere o f consumption has become rationalized.
Ritzer asserts that while Weber viewed bureaucracy as the “paradigm case o f rationality,”
he thinks that this should be updated to McDonald’s (1993:18-19). He labeled the
current rationalization o f society McDonaldization, which is defined as ""the process by
which the principles o f the fast fo o d restaurant are coming to dominate more and more
sectors o f American society as well as the rest o f the world” (emphasis in original)
(1993:1). Ritzer argues that McDonaldization is an “extension o f the Weberian theory of
rationalization” (1993:18). In using the term McDonaldization, Ritzer is not only
referring to McDonald’s per se, but also any equivalent organization (i.e. Seven Eleven or
Jiffy Lube) (1993:xiii). Ritzer outlines the rational dimensions o f McDonald’s and similar
organizations: efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control (1993).
Similar to Weber’s concept of an Iron Cage, Ritzer takes note of the negative aspects
of rationalization for employees. Ritzer argues that McDonaldized organizations
dehumanize customers and employees alike. He writes, “The fast food restaurant offers
its employees a dehumanizing setting within which to work.” as “workers are asked to
use only a minute proportion o f all their skills and abilities” (1993:131). Fast food
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restaurants are dehumanizing in that they “minimize contact among human beings”
(1993:133). The relationship between customers and employees is “rushed” due to an
emphasis on speed and “fleeting” due to high turnover rates (1993:133). Moreover, fast
food restaurants are dehumanizing for employees, “Because employees remain on the job
for only a few months, satisfying personal relationships among employees are unlikely to
develop” (1993:134). Ritzer contends that fast food workers will be unable to improve
their work conditions. He writes:
One can predict that McDonald’s will not significantly alter
its working conditions until it is unable to find a steady
supply o f new workers. Even then, it may simply move in
the direction of eliminating human employees rather than
humanizing the work. If this is the case, we can expect to
see more automation and robotization in the fast-food
restaurants o f the future (1993:169).
In, The McDonaldization Thesis, Ritzer (1998) includes a chapter titled, “McJobs:
McDonaldization and Its Relationship to the Labor Process” where he explores the affect
o f rationalization on the labor process (1998:61). He paints an incredibly bleak picture of
fast food employment. Ritzer decries the power o f capitalists to control workers. Ritzer
claims that McDonald’s has succeeded in controlling not only the actions o f workers but
also their diction (suggestive selling) and affectation (an emphasis on smiling). He writes,
“McDonaldized jobs are tightly scripted: they are characterized by both routineized
actions...and scripted interactions” (emphasis in original) (1998:63-64). According to
Ritzer, corporations completely dominate workers who possess little to no autonomy. He
relates, “Beyond the usual exploitation o f being paid less than the value of what they
produce, McDonald’s employees are often not guaranteed that they will work the number
o f hours they are supposed to on a given day. If business is slow, they may be sent home
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early in order that the employer can economize on labor cost” (1998:66). Additionally,
McDonald’s successfully appropriates customers, who now perform tasks formally
assigned to employees, such as busing one’s table, significantly reducing labor costs.
Consequently, employees are more expendable and have even less room to resist their
employers. Ritzer argues that franchisees, the owners o f the individual restaurants,
maintain very little autonomy. Despite the fact that they provide much of the capital for
their restaurant, they exercise limited control over it. Ritzer writes, “The operators take
much of the financial risk, while the franchise companies sit back and (often) rake in the
profits. In addition, the franchise companies frequently have detailed rules, regulations,
and even inspectors that they use to control the operators” (1998:68).
Currently workplace repression is facilitated by structural and cultural forces that
augment managerial efforts to control workers. An example o f structural control can be
found in the
drive-through window associated with the fast food
restaurant... structures both what customers in their cars
and employees in their booths can and cannot do. They can
efficiently exchange money for food, but their positions (in
a car and a booth) and the press of other cars in the queue
make any kind o f personal interaction virtually impossible
(1998:62).
Moreover, individuals come to accept McDonaldization, subsequently destroying all
resistance (1998:68). In fact, “workers and customers often both buy into
McDonaldization and are actively involved in its creation” (1998:66). Workers who
cannot conceive of an alternative to the reified state o f affairs cannot be expected to
reorder their environment.
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Braverman, Ritzer, and Weber describe a world where the economic elite has
successfully rationalized the world for their own benefit and to the detriment of low-level
employees. Ritzer expands on Weber to show how fast food workers have very little
autonomy or ability to gain more through negotiation. A number o f ethnographers have
examined the lived experience of fast food workers. Although these ethnographic
presentations have considered issues of worker autonomy and negotiations, they have not
done so from the negotiated order perspective. The next section will provide an overview
o f the negotiated order perspective and its relevance to the lived experience of fast food
workers. It should be noted that there has been considerable literature analyzing the
interaction processes among organizational members. Some classic studies include Karl
Weick’s (1979) analysis of the sense making processes among actors (i.e. the “double
interact”). Granovetter’s (1985) analysis of social networking as related to decision
making (i.e. “embeddedness”). Lastly, Randall Stokes and John Hewitt’s (1976) study of
role taking and adjustment to the behavior o f others (i.e. “Alignment o f Actions”).
However, this research does not focus on the micro social psychological processes
involved, but instead describes how workers act to satisfy their motivations, solely in the
tradition of work from the negotiated order perspective.
The Negotiated Order Perspective
The negotiated order perspective is an attempt by interactionist sociologists to
account for the relationship between structure and agency in social life, particularly in
organizations. Gary Alan Fine (1996) lists the critical assumptions o f the negotiated order
perspective. The first is that social order is based on negotiation (1996:3). Social order
results from the process o f negotiation. Strauss writes, “Even dictators find it impossible
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and inexpedient simply and always to order command, demand, threaten, manipulate, or
use force; about some issues and activities they must persuade and negotiate” (1978:ix).
Social order is not a priori; rather it is created through interaction. The second assumption
is “specific negotiations are contingent on the structure o f the organization and the field
in which the organization operates” (1996:3-4). Power differentials affect negotiations in
patterned ways. There are structural features such as laws, normative values, and
economic forces, which affect negotiations. The third assumption is that negotiations are
impermanent. They must be continually renewed (1996:3). Lastly, “structural changes in
the organization require a revision o f the negotiated order” (1996:3). In as much as
negotiations are impermanent and affected by structural features, the social order will
have to be renegotiated when structural features change.
Strauss defines negotiations as “one o f the possible means o f “getting things
accomplished” when parties need to deal with each other to get those things done”
(1978:2). He attempts to differentiate negotiations fi-om “other modes of attaining desired
ends-such as persuasion, education, appeal to authority, or the use o f coercion or coercive
threat” (1978:2). Strauss’ concept o f negotiation is the quintessential example o f a
sensitizing concept (Blumer 1954) in that there is no clear and distinct definition of
negotiation that can be made independent o f context. Research from the negotiated order
perspective has demonstrated that negotiations may take on a number o f different forms
depending on the situation (Morgan 1975; Strauss 1978). These modes may be used in
different combinations in different situations.
Strauss identifies three main analytical dimensions in the negotiated order
perspective. These dimensions include the negotiations, the structural context, and the
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negotiation context. The first is a description o f the negotiations. Strauss states, “Included
in the descriptions will be the accompanying interactions, types o f actors, their strategies
and tactics” as well as “consequences” and “subprocesses o f negotiation” (1978:98). This
dimension includes the motivations o f the social actors, how they go about gaining what
they want, and how successful they are. Researchers analyzing a social setting fi-om the
negotiated order perspective must describe the types o f negotiation that occur. A
description o f the negotiations should elucidate, what Strauss terms “the subprocesses of
negotiation” that are exemplified by “tradeoffs, obtaining kickbacks, compromising
toward the middle, paying off debts, and reaching negotiated agreements” (1978:237).
The subprocesses are behaviors engaged in by actors who are negotiating with one
another. The subprocesses o f negotiation are not necessarily expressed through verbal
communication. The term negotiation is a sensitizing concept. Therefore, negotiations
may take forms that are not usually associated with the denotations o f the word. For
instance, negotiations may be explicit or implicit. At times, individuals explicitly work
out an arrangement, while at other times the following pertains:
Negotiations may be very brief, made without any verbal
exchange or obvious gestural manifestation; nevertheless,
the parties may be perfectly aware o f “what they are
doing”-they may not call this negotiating bargaining, but
they surely regard its product as some sort o f worked-out
agreement. Other negotiations may be so implicit that the
respective parties may not be thoroughly aware that they
have engaged in or completed a negotiated transaction. If
the latter kind o f agreement gets broken by one person,
however, the other is sure to experience some feeling,
whether surprise, disappointment, annoyance, anger, or
even a sense of betrayal or exploitation, but possibly also
relief or unexpected pleasure (Strauss 1978:224-225).
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As will become clear below, the existence o f implicit negotiations may exist in situations
where explicit negotiation has seemingly been squashed.
The second dimension is the structural context. Strauss states “the structural context
is that “within which” the negotiations take place, in the largest sense” (1978:98).
Essentially, he is referring to the larger structural features that affect negotiations.
Structural features may include the demography, economy, laws, cultural norms such as
racism or sexism, infrastructure, and geography that influence the negotiation context.
The negotiated order perspective does not assign deterministic qualities to the structural
context. Strauss writes, “Structural context is larger, more encompassing than negotiation
context, but the lines o f impact can run either way. That is, changes in the former may
impact on the latter, and vice versa” (emphasis in original) (1978:101).
The negotiation context is the analytical structure that houses the interaction. He
provides a number of variables that relate to negotiation context such as the number of
actors, the stakes o f the negotiation, the relative power o f the negotiators, the openness of
negotiations, the number and clarity o f negotiated issues, and the “options to avoiding or
discontinuing negotiation” (1978:100). The negotiation context consists o f what directly
affects the negotiations. Strauss differentiates between structural and negotiation
contexts. He claims “the structural context bears directly on the negotiation context, but
the latter refers more specifically to the structural properties entering very directly as
conditions into the course o f the negotiation itself’ (1978:99). In as much as the
proceeding concepts are sensitizing concepts, researchers have added to the list proposed
by Strauss. For example, Noreen Sugrue has argued that “emotions can and do become
properties of negotiation contexts” (1982:280).
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Emotions and Negotiation
Sugrue posits, “Each participant negotiates from a particular emotion standpoint. That
is, while each may acknowledge that the emotion context is one of, say anger, one person
may have intense feelings leading to that emotion, while the other may not have those
feelings” (emphasis in original) (1982:281). Although “there can be a sharing o f similar
or parallel feelings, but not o f identical feelings. The concept o f emotion standpoint thus
allows for the analysis of each person’s perspective during negotiations that are directly
influenced by emotion context” (1982:281). This revelation brings up two important
points pertinent to the negotiated order perspective. The first is that negotiations contain
rational as well as extrarational factors. This aspect distinguishes the negotiated order
perspective from rational choice or exchange theory. Second, a researcher from the
negotiated order perspective must carefully understand the position o f the individual
negotiators. There will never be one uniform perspective o f “the workers” even when
they engage in collective bargaining. In any social order, voluntary or involuntary,
members come from slightly different perspectives. Therefore, it is imperative that
researchers avoid conflating the perspectives o f workers. An analysis from the negotiated
order perspective should consider the “existential selves” (Smith 1984) o f a given milieu.
Negotiated Order and Symbolic Interactionism
Negotiated order is one way that symbolic interactionists have attempted to
understand social order (Maines 1977). As such, it is based on the same assumptions as
symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionists seek to understand “the actual
formation of conduct in social interaction and not to assiune that social and cultural
patterns by themselves explain conduct. In this task they emphasize meaning, arguing

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

that people act on the basis o f meanings they construct in social interaction” (Hewitt
1994:25-26). Additionally, “symbolic interactionists view human beings not only as
shaped by culture and society, but also as capable o f shaping them ... culture and society
depend upon human actions constructed on the basis o f meanings formed in everyday
social interaction” (Hewitt 1994:26). The negotiated order perspective rests on these
implicit assumptions.
Concepts such as negotiation, negotiation context, and structural contexts are
examples o f Herbert Blumer’s notion o f sensitizing concepts (1954). Blumer writes,
“Because of the varying nature of the concrete expression from instance to instance we
have to rely, apparently, on general guides and not on fixed traits or modes o f
expression” (1954:149). Moreover, these “general guidelines” or “sensitizing concepts”
are to be “tested, improved and refined” (Blumer 1954:149-150). Clearly influenced by
Blumer, Strauss writes:
These properties o f negotiation contexts are not logical
constructs, but emerged from the examination o f numerous
instances o f negotiation.. .whenever properties are salient in
a given case involving negotiations; I bring them out in
analyzing the specific negotiation context for that case. The
chief consideration... is the relevance, not “logic,” in
developing the specific typologies or analyses o f context.
One must judge for oneself the fit and relevance of these
negotiation contexts to the specific cases o f negotiation to
which they are applied. Their various permutations and
clustering constitute the explanations for the specific kinds
o f negotiators, interactions, tacit, strategies, subprocesses of
negotiation, and consequences that will be discussed. O f
course, it is expected that this list o f useful properties o f the
negotiation context will be added to by other researchers as
they do their own studies” (1978:100).
Strauss’ preceding discussion o f how he intends to study negotiations mirrors Blumer’s
notion o f a “sensitizing concept” (1954).
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As a variant o f symbolic interaction, the negotiated order perspective is based in large
part on the work o f George Herbert Mead. David Maines explains Mead’s influence on
negotiated order, “among Mead’s many contributions to sociological thought was the
argument that human conduct cannot be properly understood unless the social
organizational matrices in which conduct takes place are first understood” (1977:244).
Maines also discusses the relevance o f Mead’s work on the interpretation o f the past. He
writes.
Mead argued that the past is not only continually being
redefined in light o f the present, but that it has a structuring
effect on what is likely to occur in the present. He presents
us with a dialectical view encompassing structure and
process, determinacy and indeterminacy. It is that
dialectical perspective that lies at the base o f the negotiated
order, and that appears in a number o f studies informed by
that perspective” (1975:244).
The negotiated order perspective adapts Mead’s notion that structure and process must be
viewed together.
Negotiated Order and Employee Autonomy
Maines reports, “issues pertaining to autonomy are central” in analyses conducted
from the negotiated order perspective (1977:245). D. H. J. Morgan uses the negotiated
order perspective to explain how workers are able to gain and maintain autonomy within
their jobs (1975). Morgan uses Fredrick Katz’s definition o f autonomy “as the absence o f
external constraint” (1968:4). Katz argues, “workers have considerable autonomy within
the confines of the organization. Even when work is prescribed in exact detail, the work
role tends to be defined narrowly. This situation leaves a considerable portion o f the
workers life within the work organization undefined' (emphasis in original) (1968:47).
While Morgan accepts Katz’s argument that factory workers have autonomy within the
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organization he does not accept Katz’s structural functionalist portrayal o f autonomy,
which “accords the worker a relatively passive role in the organization, a willing object
of managerial repressive tolerance” (1975:207). Morgan then discusses the negotiated
order of the workplace. He asserts:
The concept o f “negotiation” has arisen out of the
realization that human behavior cannot readily be
understood simply by reference back to a normative order
or, in the case of organizational settings, to a set o f rules...
The social order of say, a workplace is not a once-and-forall accomplishment brought about by either the ultimate
threat o f force, deprivation, or a postulated harmony o f
interests, but is something which is subject to continuous
negotiation. (1975:209).
Morgan challenges Strauss’ notion of negotiation. Morgan uses the concept of
negotiation as a “generalized metaphor for human conduct” (1975). Instead o f only
focusing on explicit negotiations, sociologists should recognize two levels o f negotiation.
The first is
An everyday covert implicit substratum o f negotiation. The
appropriateness of the use o f the negotiation is determined
by the problem under investigation and indeed, the
negotiation between the investigator and his critical
professional colleagues.” The second is “a more overt form
o f negotiation which is recognized as such by the
participants (1975:211).
He maintains that negotiations do not take place amongst equals. Some actors have far
more power than do others. Morgan asserts, “negotiation is not randomly distributed
throughout an organization, but is patterned according to the particular set of statuses
which form the structure of the organization” (1975:211). Morgan concludes that the
negotiated order perspective may actually “draw our attention to those persons whom one
has to take accoimt o f in this process o f negotiation. Thus an emphasis on negotiation, far
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from ignoring the imequal distribution o f power in an organization, in fact draws our
attention to the sources o f that power, the uses to which it is put, and its limits”
(1975:211-212). Morgan presents the limits o f power. Despite power differentials, “this
account shows that there are limits to the exercise of managerial or supervisory power.
These limits are less in terms o f formal rules and more in terms o f their expectations of
what the workers will stand for regarding practices that have now come to be taken as
given” (1975:224). Additionally, Morgan (1975) explains that autonomy is not static, as
Katz (1968) professes. Rather it is something that is continually worked out through
negotiation. Morgan claims, “The two concepts stand in reciprocal relationship to each
other for autonomy refers to those areas which are, for the time being free from the
necessity of overt negotiation, while negotiation can be seen as being about the
enlargement, maintenance, or diminution o f existing sphere o f autonomy” (1975:212).
The first area of negotiation, that Morgan analyzes, is the use o f the radios in the
factory. In the factory, legitimate radio use was defined by a number o f important rules
such as what programs could be played, and what the volume should be set at. These
rules were neither clearly defined nor evenly enforced. The workers tended to use the
radio as they pleased until management enforced the rules. We can see the atomization of
the workers who did not comprise a uniform bargaining unit. Some workers liked to play
music loudly, while others did not like the high volume pop music. Conflicts over the
radios were crudely divided by age, with young women, who were the majority in the
factory, playing pop music loudly, and a majority faction o f older women who did not
care much for loud pop music. Although the sympathies o f management were with the
older group, management had to respect the wishes of the younger group because “the
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presence o f a group o f younger girls was felt to be necessary for some o f the finer
assembly work” (1975:215). Younger workers by virtue o f their perceived worth to the
factory were able to compensate for their numerical inferiority. Morgan states that they
were able to bargain for greater use o f the radios because “it was on the whole easier for
management not to make an issue o f this relatively minor problem and that it meant that
something could be kept in reserve for bargaining over other more serious matters”
(1975:216). Morgan contends that radio use represents “an area o f autonomy in the
workshop that was overt, that was o f doubtful legitimacy, but which was generally
tolerated. However this was not a stable once-and-for-all situation, but was the subject of
occasional negotiation” (1975:216).
Morgan also examines the negotiation o f time in the factory. In a factory, time is
highly regulated. Unlike radio use, the rules regarding time are clearly delineated with
time cards and bells. Workers, whose time was highly regulated, engaged in implicit
negotiations with management over the use o f time. For example, workers would try to
reduce the number o f hours that they had to work by stopping work early before breaks
and the end o f the day or by lingering over breaks before starting work. Workers would
also take disguised breaks, for instance, chatting with a co-worker while going to the
storeroom for supplies. Sometimes management would counter negotiate; for instance,
the assistant supervisor would sometimes prevent workers from getting their coats early
by standing near the cloakroom. Management was completely aware o f how the workers
would find ways to reduce their work time; some estimated that employees were able to
“waste” an hour per day. Morgan (1975) contends that workers were able to continue this
behavior because time wasting is a part of an ongoing negotiation with management.
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Management did not stop the practices because they “liked to keep a bargaining counter
in reserve for use on more strategic occasions” (1975:221). Some actors thought that the
time wasting had become established slowly and incrementally. Additionally, some
thought that the time wasting went unchallenged because it was not worth disturbing the
relationship between workers and management. Morgan argues that management was not
in complete control o f the situation. He writes, “To say that management could use
elements in the situation in the more overt processes o f negotiation is not to say that it
was fully able to choose whether to have these elements in the first place nor was it
necessarily the case that workers responded to them in those terms” (1975:222). Morgan
adds that negotiation takes place on an individual and group level. Not all workers
“wasted” time equally. While single worker’s implicit negotiations may have been
influenced by the implicit negotiations o f others, they were conducted at an individual
level (1975:223).
Fast food restaurants, like factories, are governed by a strict formal rationality that
seeks, through Tayloristic means to make workers conform to practices that allow for the
aims of management to come to fruition. The goals o f management are not always
commensurate with those of fast food workers (Leidner 1993). Wnile a number of
researchers have considered the nature o f autonomy in fast food restaurants, none have
applied the negotiated order perspective to this endeavor (Garson 1988; Reiter 1991;
Leidner 1993; Newman 1999; Royle 2000; Tannock 2001). Moreover, those who have
used the negotiated order perspective have tended to analyze settings that clearly
demonstrate issues of negotiation. These researchers have focused heavily on skilled
organizational members and how they seek to achieve their shared and divergent goals
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through interaction (for instance Strauss et al. 1963, 1981; Hall and Hall 1982; Kleinman
1982; Levy 1982; and Spencer 1993). In as much as these studies are helpful in
demonstrating how social order is maintained through interaction, they collectively
ignore social situations that are not readily amenable to the existing analytical tools o f
negotiated order. The perspective may be enriched by further study o f settings that are
rigidly defined.
Morgan’s application of the negotiated order perspective to the study o f factory
workers is an important step in this effort. In his analysis, he argues that although
behavior in the factory is rigidly constrained by rules, workers negotiate an agreement
with management that allows both groups to achieve their goals, to some extent. From
Morgan’s study, we can surmise that when management in a highly rationalized work
environment suppresses explicit negotiation, it merely takes on different forms (1975).
Since explicit negotiations over some rules are not possible, workers engage in implicit
negotiation, wherein, negotiation is imstated and occurs through nonverbal action.
Morgan’s notion of implicit negotiation can be translated into other repressive milieus
to understand how workers are able to create autonomy where it does not ostensibly exist.
As previously mentioned, fast food restaurants present an appropriate challenge to a
researcher, who wishes to understand how people may have limited freedom in
seemingly restricted environments. As previously stated, demonstrating worker autonomy
is not the end goal o f this research, rather; it will be to understand how workers are able
to achieve their own goals when they are at variance with those o f management. The
degree to which workers are successful at achieving goals that are in conflict with
managerial goals is dependent on their degree o f autonomy.
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Current ethnographic research has tended to depict fast food workers as having
neither autonomy nor the agency to attain autonomy (Garson 1988; Reiter 1991). While
fast food workers certainly do not share the levels o f autonomy enjoyed by lawyers,
doctors, and architects, it is difficult to believe that millions o f workers have been
completely controlled by management in all settings. In keeping with the negotiated order
perspective, I suspect that in different negotiation contexts fast food workers are variably
capable o f negotiating implicitly and explicitly for their ends.
Factors affecting the negotiation context might include: the size o f the restaurant;
whether the restaurant is franchised or company operated, the type of contract between
the franchisee and the franchisor; the goals of the franchisee; the number o f customers
who patronize the restaurant; the location o f the restaurant, the goals o f the employees,
how easily employees may be replaced; whether relations between employees and
management are primary, secondary, or mixed and no doubt many others. Ethnographic
research that is cognizant o f the preceding factors (as well as others) that affect the
negotiation context may be able to demonstrate how order is maintained in the restaurant
with both parties achieving their goals to enough o f an extent so as to make their
relationship viable.
It should be noted that a number o f sociologists have considered the topic of worker
agency. Michael Burawoy (1979) found that employers do not exercise the degree of
control of lower level employees reported by Braverman (1974). David Mechanic (1962)
demonstrates how many low-level workers are able to wield considerable power. Randy
Hodson (1991) contends that workers play an active role in the construction o f their
social environment. While these studies and others are related to this research, they will

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e c o p y rig h t o w n e r . F u r th e r re p r o d u c tio n p rohib ited w ith o u t p e rm is s io n .

30

not be given thorough treatment here for two reasons. First, they are not explicitly from
the negotiated order perspective. Second, they are not dealing directly with fast food
restaurants that are the focus o f this study.
Fast Food Ethnographies
A number o f journalists, sociologists, and anthropologists have done ethnographic
research o f routinzed restaurants. This section will attempt to demonstrate how the
negotiated order perspective could better inform the ethnographic study of fast food
workers. Strauss suggests that researchers who are “interested in general theory o f
negotiation for its own sake” may analyze existing data (emphasis in original)
(1978:245). Fiuthermore, “their elaborations and qualifications o f a negotiation theory
would proceed by further theoretical sampling o f data from extant negotiation literature
in many different substantive areas. This secondary analysis could greatly- and probably
quickly- help to further a general theory” (1978:245). This section o f the literature review
seeks to achieve some of the preceding objectives. Although I will not be using the
existing data to directly inform a burgeoning theory o f negotiations, I will be using the
existing data to argue that the negotiated order perspective may gain from an analysis o f
fast food restaurants.
Barbara Garson
Barbara Garson’s (1988) publication. The Electronic Sweatshop, provides a
journalistic account o f how “a combination o f twentieth-century technology and
nineteenth-century scientific management is turning the Office o f the Future into the
factory o f the past” (1988:10). She argues that employers have appropriated modem
technology to thoroughly reduce worker autonomy. She claims that the centralization o f
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control stems from a desire to reduce costs and an “irrational prejudice against people”
(1988:13). Garson interviews a number of workers including fast food workers, social
workers, and stockbrokers. Her presentation o f fast food work is o f particular interest
here.
Garson provides the contents o f her interviews with two former crew persons, one
current crew person, and a recently resigned manager o f a corporate owned McDonald’s
in New York City. The general theme o f the chapter is that McDonald’s has introduced
computerized systems that have eliminated any self-determination that may be exercised
by crew workers and management alike. Automated buzzers tell an employee when it is
okay to pull a fillet o ’ fish out of the fryer, a bell beeps when it is time to flip the burgers,
the condiment guns are calibrated for Big Macs and cheeseburgers, and a computer
program predicts how many employees will be needed for a given shift. One interviewee
left after only one day because the managers would not give her the schedule that she
desired. Another employee, who cannot afford the luxury o f quitting, is frequently
chastised for voiding the register without the assistance o f a manager. In short, a
computerized formal rationality has eradicated any sense o f freedom or creativity. The
jobs have been deskilled to the point where the most competent crew person can be
replaced in a matter o f minutes. Even a highly capable manager admits, “Basically, I
can’t be any more creative than a crew person. I can’t take any more initiative then the
person on the register” (1988:35).
From her interviews, Garson concludes, McDonald’s has successfully rationalized its
operations. She laments:
By combining twentieth-century computer technology with
nineteenth- century time and motion studies, the
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McDonald’s corporation has broken the jobs o f griddleman,
waitress, cashier, and even manager down into small,
simple, small steps. Historically these have been service
jobs involving a lot o f flexibility and personal flare. But the
corporation has systematically extracted the decision
making elements from filling french fry boxes or
scheduling staff. They’ve siphoned the know-how from the
employees into the programs. They relentlessly weed out
all variables that might make it necessary to make a
decision at the store level, whether on pickles or on
cleaning procedures. (1988:37)
Restaurant workers that formally contained a great deal of autonomy have become gears
in a Weberian wheel.
Given these same data, a researcher coming from the negotiated order perspective
might ask if the structural context (such as unemployment rate, the type o f fast food
restaurant) might affect the negotiation context. In other words, can we really assume that
this is the situation that all fast food workers find themselves in or is this one restaurant
somewhat anomalous? Could it be that structural change, also the result o f negotiation
(Denzin 1977a, 1978) could alter the negotiation context such that workers (who cared
to) might be able to negotiate for increased autonomy?
Ester Reiter
Ester Reiter’s ethnography, Making Fast Food, explores the lived experience o f fast
workers in a Burger King restaurant in suburban Toronto. Reiter, like Garson (1988),
explains how fast food work has been deskilled (1991). For instance, “the cashier inside
the store does not need to know how to make change to operate the register” (1991:84).
In addition, Reiter relates that interactions are scripted (1991:84). Reiter provides detailed
descriptions of the restaurant, the promotional hierarchy, worker profile, training, and
work tasks.
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She explains the motivations for employment at Burger King. The reasons are that it
fits the schedule o f workers (particularly students and mothers), it is among the only jobs
available to unskilled workers, and the location o f the restaurant is convenient for some
employees. Reiter identifies scheduling to be o f the highest concern for employees. The
first step to discovering how workers attain their goals is to find out what those goals are.
Reiter succeeds in this, but does not really explain how workers go about obtaining the
schedule they desire.
Reiter relates that Burger King rotated its managers in the stores that it owned. She
writes, “The director explained that they didn’t want the managers to become “stale.”
This was not very clear to me. Perhaps, I thought, managers who got to know their
subordinates well would be less likely to stick closely to Burger King rules” (1991:104).
Reiter provides an example o f a manager who disliked Burger King’s attempt to save
profits by cutting crewmember hours. Burger King is attempting to prevent the conflation
of primary and secondary relationships. Like Weber’s ideal type bureaucracy. Burger
King believes that it is in their best interests to prevent informality between workers and
managers. Moreover, Burger King makes substantial claims on its employees. She writes,
employees “are asked to place their responsibilities to Burger King above everything else
in their lives: school, family, friends.” (1991:107). Burger King, operating according to
the logic of scientific management, seeks to squeeze as much as it can from its
employees. Reiter concludes, “just as Taylor considered that workers were ‘soldiering’ if
they worked at less than their physiological maximum, so Burger King considers that it is
entitled to the physiological maximum from its minimum wage employees” (1991:120).
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Burger King seeks to increase profitability through a formally rational routinization
o f labor. Reiter, like Ritzer (1993) and Garson (1988) discusses the importance o f
computers in rationalizing food service. Burger King uses computers to track inventory
and productivity. Computers are also used to decide the most efficient use o f labor.
Technology is used to control (or limit the autonomy of) workers. Reiter provides an
interesting example o f the negotiated interaction between workers and management by
revealing how routinization fails to squash all variance. She writes, this tightly organized
system is not completely predictable.. .Even in a very controlled situation, there are good
days and bad days, good managers and bad managers” (1991:123). Reiter explains:
There is a consensual aspect in translating labour power
into labour; workers cooperation is needed, even if it is just
at the level o f showing up on time. However, the kind o f
political power that can be exercised by a worker with
scarce, not easily obtainable skills... is quite a bit greater
than that o f a worker who can be instantly replaced by
another if she o f he doesn’t smile enough (1991:129).
Essentially, there is more to a fast food restaurant than the Weberian formal rational plan.
No matter what rules are created by upper level management, operations have to be
enforced by managers and followed by employees.
Reiter delineates Burger King’s strategies for controlling its labor force. In addition to
scientific management. Burger King uses psychology to influence employees (1991:133).
For instance, management has appropriated Maslow’s “hierarchy o f needs” and
Herzberg’s “satisfiers and disatisfiers” to conclude that emotional encouragement can
satisfy workers, in place o f improved wages, hours, and working conditions (1991:135).
Reiter concludes that management attempts to extract as much as they can from
employees before they resign. She writes, “Burger King efforts to martial loyalty are
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focused on creating the kind of morale that will keep work intense and productivity high.
The attempts to ensure long-term commitment are minimal” (1991:139). Workers are
given miniscule raises and poor opportimities for advancement. Reiter explains that
promotion at Burger King is problematic in that “A production leader’s working
conditions... are actually worse than those for crew, and they achieve little monetary
gain” (1991:139). Instead, management chooses to use inexpensive methods such as
social activities, competitions, and managerial encouragement to extract as much effort as
possible from employees. In addition, the restaurant is designed to allow waiting
customers to view the employees. Workers are thus pressured to work faster (1991). The
previous manipulations could be labeled management’s negotiations. A researcher from
the negotiated order perspective would note that management is attempting to implicitly
negotiate for their ends with motivational items instead of offering higher wages.
Reiter considers the role o f worker agency. She relates that she was surprised to find
that the management at Burger King had far more power over their employees than she
imagined. She writes:
I assumed... that in a fast food restaurant there were bound
to be forms of cooperation between workers and some
mediating power that workers would have over
management directives... I looked and looked by never
found this active participation in determining the labour
process... Workers at Burger King do not have even a
limited arena in which they can delude themselves into
thinking o f the labour process as a game in which they
participate via commonly agreed-upon rules. Control o f the
game and setting the rules o f playing are the prerogative of
Burger King alone. If one does not choose to play by
Burger King’s rules, one must leave the game entirely
(1991:141).
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Workers identified favored and distasteful job tasks. Reiter does not report how
workers vie for preferred tasks. Rather, she seems to imply that workers are simply
assigned to assorted tasks by a multitude o f managers. Workers are pressured to work
hard regardless o f how many customers are in the restaurant. Workers did not challenge
(overtly or covertly) managerial authority. She does, however, offer some examples of
worker resistance. For instance, one worker circumvented a S2.50 limit on free employee
food by ringing herself up for one item and taking a more expensive one. Another worker
walked off after continually being denied a brake (1991). Reiter claims that workers' only
response to unfavorable conditions was to leave. Quitting is the only individual action
that she recognizes. Reiter presents unionization as the only possible means by which
workers may successfully negotiate for their goals (1991).
Reiter indicates that Burger King has more or less eradicated worker autonomy. She
concludes, “there is little personal space at Burger King. The ‘working knowledge’ or
‘tacit skills’ Burger King workers bring to their jobs give them little room to manceuver
in the moderating management directives. Even physical needs such as drinking water or
using the washroom are regulated” (1991 ; 165). Workers have no autonomy and there is
nothing they can do to negotiate for more autonomy “their individual protests, which
usually take the form o f “voting with their feet”, however, do not change management
prerogatives in the organization of the workplace” (1991:165). She does not allow for the
possibility that given some structural changes workers could negotiate for increased
autonomy.
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Robin Leidner
Robin Leidner’s (1993) ethnography. Fast Food, Fast Talk, focuses on the
routinization of service work. She presents interview and participant observation data
from a company owned McDonald’s restaurant and an Insurance company. Leidner’s
work is of particular interest because her data relate to processes o f negotiation in
rationalized food service establishments. Leidner argues that employee-employer
relationships are not intrinsically antagonistic. Moreover, the relationships are not static,
but change with different situations. Both insights support the negotiated order
perspective. Rather than focusing only on the relationship between management and
workers, Leidner posits that the examination o f interactive service work (including fast
food) must include the three-way relationship between workers, management, and
customers. She writes, “All three parties are trying to arrange the interactions to their own
advantage, whether they want to maximize speed, convenience, pleasantness, efficiency,
customization o f service, degree o f exertion, or any other outcome they feel to be
beneficial” (1993:3-4). The implication is that when the interests o f management and
workers coincide they may cooperate to see that their own interests are met. In another
situation, workers and customers may form a temporary alliance against the restaurant
owners. Alliances shift with the situation. We may observe situations where it is in the
“self-defined” best interest o f workers to comply with routinization (Leidner 1993:135).
However, in other situations, workers may, successfully resist routinization through
negotiation and build autonomous spaces for themselves. Leidner finds evidence of
worker agency. She writes, “Analysis o f routinization is too often cut short by the
assumption that management has the capacity to impose routines unilaterally, an
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assumption that historical research on routinization has proven untenable” (1993:127).
Although, not coming from the negotiated order perspective, she demonstrates how the
social order o f the restaurant is continually recreated through strategic interaction that
involves patterned negotiations that are affected by structure.
In some instances, routinization can be beneficial to employees. She claims, “workers
expressed relatively little dissatisfaction with the extreme routinization...” as some
workers “felt that their interactions with customers were more than mechanical and that
they were able to express their personalities on the job (1993:134). Other workers, in
contrast, appreciated the routine precisely because it did not require that they treat
exchanges with customers as full-fledged personal interactions” (1993:134-135). As
would be necessary in an analysis from the negotiated order perspective she is identifying
individual worker goals and how they attain them.
Leidner also demonstrates worker resistance to the aspects o f formal rationality that
they found particularly offensive. For instance, “Workers disobeyed the rule about
suggestive selling whenever they could get away with it” (1993:140). Her analysis can be
translated into the negotiated order terminology. She provides data that indicate implicit
negotiation between managers, workers, and customers concerning suggestive selling. It
was in management’s best interest for workers to suggest additional products; this
practice annoyed many customers. Employees “were more likely to resolve this dilemma
in the customers’ favor, because management had not created any incentives that brought
the workers interests into line with their own” (1993:140). The divergent interests of
customers and management affected the social order o f the restaurant. Management
wants workers to engage in suggestive selling and negotiates for this by asking workers
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to do so. When workers engage in suggestive selling customers often become annoyed,
they negotiate against this annoyance by acting disparagingly toward employees.
Employees are caught between customers and management. In this case, the customers’
implicit negotiation action (acting aimoyed) is more compelling than management’s
negotiation (continually requesting but not sanctioning employees) many employees
reorder their environment by refusing to engage in suggestive selling. Per the negotiated
order perspective, this arrangement is not permanent. Managers could renegotiate, by
offering employees rewards or sanctions that may (but not necessarily) convince workers
to engage in the practice of suggestive selling. This situation is very similar to what
Morgan (1975) described, except for the fact that I have superimposed negotiated order
terminology on Leidner’s account o f this instance o f negotiation.
Leidner, like Reiter, identifies scheduling as an issue o f central importance to
McDonald’s employees. She reports considerable variation in the number of hours
desired by workers. Although, some workers were content with few hours, others who
desired more hours “were expected to compete for them, proving themselves deserving
through conscientious job performance. In practice, a core group o f about twenty steady
workers was sure to get its preferred hours, but cutting back an employee’s hours was a
standard way the managers showed their displeasure over poor performance or attitude”
(1991:62). She also reports that management may seek to lengthen or shorten individual
shifts depending on the number of customers at a given time. Workers tended to be
successful in obtaining a schedule that fit their needs. “For example, workers who played
on a high school team could cut down their hours during the sports season, and workers
who needed to take a particular day off could usually arrange it if they gave sufficient
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notice” (1993:64). Although she does not analyze the process by which workers are able
to negotiate for desired schedules, she does identify a possible site of negotiation. In a
process that will be described in chapter four, workers will move from the periphery to
the “core” to increase their position in negotiations. Despite the fact that Leidner’s
ethnography does not mention negotiated order, she does show how the social order of
the restaurant is continually created through structured interaction as the negotiated order
perspective posits it.
Katherine Newman
Katherine Newman’s (1999), No Shame in M y Game, examines impoverished fast
food employees in Harlem. Although the focus o f the work is much wider than
interactions within restaurants, she does present data that is relevant to workplace
negotiations. For instance, she explains how the high unemployment rate in Harlem
serves to depress job wages (1999:63). From the negotiated order perspective one might
conclude that the structural context o f the restaurant, in this case the unemployment rate,
impinges on the negotiation context by reducing the power o f employees in negotiations
over wages. Newman also describes the process by which prospective employees
negotiate for a position. She explains how employees seeking employment must carefully
present themselves and use social net works. Newman also relates that managers cannot
accomplish their goals by simply resting on their power to dismiss disobedient
employees. She explains:
Ninety percent of Fernando’s job involves coaxing his
workforce to abide by the dozens o f rules the firm imposes
over the preparation of food. There are regulations covering
virtually every move a worker makes in the production
process. While he has the authority to discipline workers,
who fail to cooperate, he has discovered what most
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manages come to know in time: a willing workforce is
much easier to supervise. And as Fernando points out, you
cannot keep a constant watch on everybody (1999:179).
This “coaxing” may also be described as Fernando’s negotiation with his employees to
encourage workers to follow the regulations that have been set by the corporation.
Tony Royle
Tony Royle (2000), in Working fo r M cDonald’s in Europe, presents data on fast food
work. Royle analyzes the relationship between workers and managers in Europe, with
particular attention given to Germany and Great Britain. He considers how workers
individually and collectively seek to achieve their personal aims. Royle’s data indicate
that the negotiated order perspective may be used to study fast food restaurants.
Royle found that there were a number of motivations for employment at McDonald’s.
Economic marginalization drives many foreign-bom and minority workers to
McDonald’s in search o f employment. Workers that have failed out o f college or an
apprenticeship may come to McDonald’s for a second chance at a managerial career.
There are “coasters” whose employment at McDonald’s allows them to ‘tread water’
while they decide what they want to do with their life. These workers may be
uninterested in climbing the corporate ladder. There are workers who have no previous
experience or who only want part-time employment (Royle 2000). Workers that approach
the metaphorical bargaining table at McDonald’s for the above reasons may have little in
the way of resources to negotiate for increased autonomy. By considering the individual
motivations o f employees, as well as their reasons for choosing to work and continuing to
work at a given restaurant we can begin to understand how workers go about negotiating
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for their ends. We may be able to delineate the limits o f negotiation. As well as why
workers may not attempt to negotiate for some goals.
Royle explains how workers may resist managerial directives by creating “short cuts”
or sabotaging the food. In contrast to the image o f the completely controlled worker
presented by Garson (1988), Royle asserts that workers often ignore orders that are not in
their interest. He writes, “Although there are rules and tight procedures for everything
and managers usually working alongside closely monitor the work, workers do
sometimes find shortcuts...” (2000:60). He relates that these short cuts tend to occur
when the restaurant is busy and the formally rational plan will not be effective. These
mavericks were labeled ‘cowboys’ in one UK restaurant. Royle quotes a floor manager,
“yeah, some o f the lads, the ‘cowboys’ have figured out how to save time on cleaning,
missing out some of the steps but getting the same results. Or, sometimes, they make
more burgers than are required by the shift leader on the wrap and call station, so that
they get a short break” (2000:60). Some workers engaged in acts o f sabotage, such as
allowing sweat or “nasal fluid” to enter the food, serving food that had fallen on the floor,
and making food with purposely unwashed hands. Additionally, the food may not be
prepared according to specifications. He claims that mangers sometimes assume what
Gouldner called an “indulgency pattern” where managers “turn a blind eye” to deviant
behavior “providing that customer demand is met” (2000:60). Although he is not using
these terms, this account represents a negotiation o f the social order. First, management
establishes a formal rational plan o f action. Second, workers adjust this plan to better fit
their own needs being careful to meet the more important goals o f the organization.
Third, management accepts these changes. This negotiation is not final, workers could try
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for too much, go over the line, so to speak, and at which point management might react
by decreasing autonomy.
In addition to examining the individual negotiations between workers and
management, Royle also considers group negotiations. While collective bargaining has
been virtually nonexistent in North America for legal and cultural reasons, European
nations tend to be more culturally and legally supportive o f unions. These structural
differences allow for greater space for negotiation than is found in the United States. In
other words, the structural context (in this case laws and norms) affects the negotiation
context. When McDonald’s first entered the European market, they resisted unionization
(Royle 2000). For the most, part unions have been unable to muster a desired level of
influence. However, European workers have had more success in terms o f collective
action than their North American counterparts. Royle explains how a combination of
cultural values, economic forces, laws, and individual motivations has allowed workers to
engage in collective bargaining (Royle 2000). Additionally, unions exert a limited
amount of influence on McDonald’s they have been able to reorder their environment so
that collective bargaining or negotiation is possibility (Royle 2000). Royle relates that
unions have improved the pay where they have existed (2000:171). His data show that
collective bargaining and legal regulations are more efficacious means o f achieving the
goals o f fast food workers than individual negotiations.
Negotiations between unequal parties are not likely to yield equitable results. The
negotiated order perspective does not argue that fast food restaurants are unable to exploit
workers. Rather, negotiated order demonstrates how organizational interactions are not
unidirectional. It is significant that employees continue to lose the battle. The social order
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continually arises from interaction and management must continue to see that its goals
are met. The negotiated order perspective argues that rationalistic oppression is a process
of keeping the worker down. In this difficult undertaking, one might expect that in
different negotiation contexts, particularly ones where management has fewer resources,
(as may be the case in smaller franchises) workers might be more able to negotiate for
autonomy. Using the negotiated order perspective to understand fast food restaurants
does not mean that workers will necessarily achieve their goals. Even though Royle is not
coming from a negotiated order perspective he presents data that suggest that the
negotiated order perspective may be a useful way to understand how workers may use
their agency to reorder their environment to their own benefit.
Stuart Tannock
Stuart Tannock (2001) in. Youth at Work, examined the implications of unionization
in two industries that employ large numbers of young workers, fast food restaurants and
grocery stores. His data on a unionized Canadian fast food restaurant he names “Fry
House” are relevant to this study. Tannock’s research is interesting from a negotiated
order perspective in that he is concemed with how age, culture, and related structural
issues serve to weaken young workers in negotiations. Moreover, Tannock explains how
unionized workers are more able to achieve their goals than are non-unionized workers
(2001).

Tannock contributes to an understanding of the negotiated order of a fast food
restaurant by noting the substantial differences between workplace environments.
Tannock explains, “The working communities found in the different outlets are not solely
the creation of workers; they are the result o f interactions among workers, managers.
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corporate employers, and local environments- as well as the union local that represents
these workers” (2001:71). He argues that working environments emerge through
negotiations. Workers may exert some influence over the labor process through
negotiation. For example, in some instances, workers will band together to pressure a
disliked manager to leave (2001:75).
Tannock supports the negotiated order perspective when he concludes:
Sociologists conventionally describe the fast-food industry
using the framework o f routinization. Researchers point to
routinization, along with close managerial supervision and
the indoctrination o f workers into global corporate cultures,
as the key element o f management control in the fast-food
workplace. The example o f Glenwood suggests that
patterns of control and worker-manager relations may be
more complicated (2001:82)
As we will find in the chapters that follow, employers are not able to simply control the
labor process.
Tannock summarizes the advantages o f unionization at one union. He writes, “Higher
starting wages, guaranteed raises, employer-provided benefits, and just-cause job
protection from arbitrary discipline and termination constitute the basic union advantage
for young Glenwood Fry House workers” (2001:158). Unionization is not an automatic
panacea; rather its usefulness is borne out in negotiations. Tannock claims, “These
contrasts in the benefits o f unionism for young stopgap workers in Box Hill and
Glenwood are not accidental. Local C has made an explicit commitment to minimizing
differences between junior and senior and younger and older workers in the Fry House
bargaining unit” (2001:160). Tannock’s research demonstrates the possible affects o f
unionization on the negotiation context o f a fast food restaurant.
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Greta Paules
Greta Paules (1991), an anthropologist, produced an ethnographic account of
waitresses at a chain restaurant located on an interstate highway in New Jersey. As her
title. Dishing it Out: Power and Resistance among Waitresses in a New Jersey'
Restaurant, indicates she is presenting “a study o f women who are neither organized nor
upwardly mobile yet actively and effectively strive to protect and enhance their position
at work” (1991:1). Paules begins Dishing it Out with a description o f the field. She
discusses the geographic location of the chain restaurant she labels “Route”, on an
interstate highway in an area “undergoing rapid residential and commercial development”
(1991:2). This constitutes an important aspect o f the negotiation context o f the restaurant.
Her ethnography is not from the negotiated order perspective, however it is very similar
to what might come from this perspective. For example, Paules asserts:
the Route waitress is not passive. She is engaged in
ongoing efforts to shield herself from the emotional and
financial hazards of her occupation and advance her work
interests. Her strategies o f action include... methods o f
manipulating management to ensure her grievances and
demands will be heeded; and techniques for controlling the
movement of customers thought the restaurant to maximize
her tip income (1991:10).
It is also interesting, that some workers are in a better position to negotiate for ends than
others are. She writes, “all waitresses are not equally skilled or aggressive in defending
their interests. Full-time workers are more prone to rebuke impatient or impolite
customers, more fearless in reproaching management, and more adept at manipulating the
tipping system” (1991:11). Although, Paules’ ethnography is dealing with waitresses in a
‘sit down’ restaurant and not fast food, her subjects have a great deal in common with
fast food workers. Paules’ ethnography focuses on low-level food servers in a formally
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rational chain of restaurants. Fast food workers, although structurally less autonomous
and less skilled face similar issues in a similar environment. Both types o f workers may
attempt to renegotiate a formally rational food service establishment.
In a chapter entitled, “Sources o f Autonomy,” she delineates the reasons why
routinization has been limited at Route. She lists inadequate training, the tipping system,
a chaotic environment, high managerial turnover, labor shortages, and the manager's role
as fill-in man as sources o f autonomy for waitresses. For example:
Employees also exploit the manager’s vulnerability as fillin man directly, to increase their control and resist
interference in their work lives. Between managers and
senior employees, and especially experienced waitresses,
virtually all negotiation takes the form o f an ultimatum:
management must comply with the employee’s demands or
redress her grievance, or she will leave. So often does a
cook threaten to walk o ff the line or a waitress threaten to
walk off the floor, that the act has acquired an almost ritual
consistency. In the following instance, a waitress who was
angered that a co-waitress was staying late and potentially
“tapping into’ her money, ensured that she would be
favorably “seated,” despite the extra person on the floor, by
threatening to walk out.
I said, “Innes, I’m in [station] one and two. If one and two
is not filled at all times from now until three. I’m getting
my coat, my pocketbook, and I ’m leaving. ” And one and
two was filled, and I made ninety-five dollars (emphasis in
original) (quoted in Paules 1991:91).
Here, we see how waitresses are able to take advantage o f structural features (labor
pressures, diminished managerial authority) to change the social order to their individual
advantage. Waitresses are able to interpret their situation and militate for increased
autonomy accordingly.
In a chapter entitled, “Up a Crooked Ladder,” Paules builds on her argument that
diminished managerial prestige and the ability o f waitresses to achieve their ends have
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led to a situation where waitresses often eschew the concept o f vertical mobility.
Waitresses see themselves as being in a better position than managers, and consequently
do not seek out promotions to management. The implication here is that waitresses are
able to decide for themselves what their course o f action should be. Instead o f accepting
the corporation’s notion o f promotion through loyal service, these waitresses are able to
act in a way that allows them to achieve their ends (Paules 1991).
Paules concludes the ethnography by restating her main point that waitresses are
capable of negotiating the routinzed restaurant. Waitresses are able to autonomously
reach their own ends because of their adaptation to structural conditions such as tipping
system, the shortage o f labor and supplies and the diminished authority o f management.
These workers are actively exploiting structural features in order to gain autonomy.
Without personal agency, these waitresses would not be able to reorder their social order
through negotiation. Structure will not create autonomy on its own; workers in highly
rationalized environments must take advantage of it if they are to affect their social order.
Paules is not explicitly using the negotiated order perspective, yet her work demonstrates
how negotiated order may be used to understand a rationalized food service environment.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how the negotiated order perspective could
be used to inform ethnographic research on fast food workers. Weber, Braverman, and
Ritzer have theorized that rationalization and scientific management have reduced the
freedom of employees. One group arguably most constrained by these processes has been
fast food workers. Ethnographic research by Garson (1988); Reiter (1991); Leidner
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(1993); Newman (1998); Royle (2000); Tannock (2001) has augmented the theoretical
work on rationalization.
Ethnographies o f routinzed restaurants present a multitude o f data that is relevant to
this study. Paules (1991) and Royle (2000) show how structural features affected
workers’ negotiations for increased autonomy. Leidner (1993) and Reiter (1991)
considered how workers negotiated for autonomy. Individually, they differ somewhat on
how much autonomy workers have; however, all agree that autonomy is severely limited.
However, these ethnographies, excluding Paules (1991), focus on one type o f restaurant,
namely McDonald’s or similarly designed restaurants. They do not adequately consider
the differentiation o f the fast food industry. Ethnographic research that analyzes fast food
restaurants from the negotiated order perspective may come to find a great deal of
diversity in the lived experience of fast food restaurants. Research that makes use of
participant observation data in different negotiation contexts may find differences
between. An ethnography written from the negotiated order perspective that takes the
individual actor’s rational and extrarational motivations and actions into account will be
able to demonstrate not only how social order is maintained through processes o f
interaction, but also how individuals are free within rationalized environments.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODS
There are a number of means o f collecting empirical data. A researcher must choose
his or her methodology by examining the research questions, theoretical guidance, and
the available resources (i.e. time, money, and skills). Fortunately, researchers in the
planning stages o f a descriptive study usually have a wealth o f past research to guide
their project. This descriptive study is no exception. There are a number o f existing
studies of fast food restaurants as well as analyses from the negotiated order perspective.
These studies guided my research design. Most studies o f negotiated order and o f fast
food restaurants have used qualitative methodology. Qualitative methodologies are used
to examine a large number of features o f a few cases (Ragin 1994). Qualitative methods
measure data that is expressed as words and include, field work and observations,
interviews, qualitative content analysis, and historical analysis (Neuman 2000). After
considering the existing literature, the particular resources that were available, as well as
my biographical relationship to the subject matter, I chose to collect data through a
combination o f auto-ethnographic and observational means.
Negotiated Order, Fast Food, and
Qualitative Methodology
The overriding purpose o f this study is to demonstrate how fast food restaurants
exemplify the maintenance of social order through processes of negotiation. Additionally,
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by using the negotiated order perspective to analyze the employee-employee and
employee-employer interactions at a fast food restaurant we may understand how and
under what structural conditions the employees in fast food restaurants may attain their
personal goals. Although this is the first study to analyze fast food restaurants using the
negotiated order perspective, there have been several studies from the negotiated order
perspective and ethnographies of fast food restaurants.
The analysis o f the negotiated order o f any milieu requires research methodologies
that collect in-depth or rich data. To analyze a milieu from the negotiated order
perspective researchers must obtain descriptions of individuals’ motivations, actions, and
interpretations. Additionally, a researcher must be aware o f stmctural data such as laws,
cultural norms, and power. Lastly, the researcher should trace the negotiations over time.
Qualitative methodology is appropriate to the study of negotiations in a fast food
restaurant for a number of reasons. First, qualitative methodology allows a researcher to
analyze the full complexity of a setting (Gubrium and Holstein 1997). Second, Jaber
Gubrium and James Holstein assert, “Qualitative research also is distinguished by a
commitment to studying social life in process, as it unfolds” (1991:12). Thirdly,
qualitative research attempts to reach subjective meanings (Gubrium and Holstein 1997).
For these reasons, researchers working from the negotiated order perspective employ
qualitative studies of a small number o f cases. Participant observation was used by
Strauss et al. to study psychiatric hospitals (1963, 1981). Likewise, Tim Faupel and
Charles Faupel (1987) used fieldwork to analyze an Introduction to Sociology classroom.
Judith Levy (1982) who studied the interaction between Hospice and medical
organizations used in-depth interviews and some observations. Raymond Lee (1980)
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employed a historical analysis o f documents and journalistic accounts to study ethnic
relations in Malaysia. Lawrence Busch (1982) used historical analysis to study the
negotiations over agricultural research. Researchers may combine a number o f methods
such as observations and interviews. For instance, Albert Meehan (1992) analyzed data
drawn from fieldwork, interviews, and an analysis o f calls made to the police, in his study
of the negotiated order o f policing.
A number of social scientific studies o f fast food restaurants have used qualitative
data. Royle’s (2000) cross-cultural study o f European McDonald’s restaurants made use
o f participant observation, questionnaires, and interviews, with the bulk o f his data
coming from interviews. Reiter (1991) explains that after some difficulty gaining entrée
she worked without pay at a Burger King restaurant in Ontario for a year. Leidner (1993)
used a combination of observations and structured interviews. Tannock’s (2001) data
come from observations of two union halls and the public spaces o f restaurants and
grocery stores and unstructured interviews with workers and union representatives.
Newman (1998) oversaw a team o f researchers who collected data through participant
observation, interviews, and diaries. Regardless o f their specific focus, these descriptive
or exploratory studies have largely sought to demonstrate the actual working experience
o f fast food employees, the meanings that this work has, and how the lives o f workers
may be improved. Qualitative methods were used to obtain details that are often left
untouched by quantitative research (Ragin 1994).
Goals o f the Study
This study is an attempt to contribute to existing theory (Ragin 1994). The negotiated
order perspective conceived o f by Strauss is not a fully developed theory (1978). Strauss
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delineates a number o f possible ways in which researchers may contribute to a theory o f
negotiation. He writes:
there are those who while doing substantive research find
also they can contribute to a general theory o f negotiation.
... they might elaborate sections o f the paradigm that are
sparse or underdeveloped-as by working through the
implications o f an additional negotiation contextual
property, by following out in more detail a property already
noted by me or any other theorist, by focusing intensively
on different subprocesses and types o f negotiation
interaction, or by treating the same ones more elaborately.
Another conventional and entirely necessary possibility is
to qualify the formulated theory, since some o f its parts are
inadequate or inaccurate. (1978:244).
The negotiated order perspective has been used to analyze a number o f different
milieus. With the exception o f Morgan (1975), few studies from the negotiated order
perspective analyze highly rationalized social orders. This research attempts to contribute
to the negotiated order perspective by demonstrating how social order is maintained
through negotiation between actors who have relatively little autonomy. Moreover, this
study seeks add to the negotiated order perspective by collecting data that will inform the
existing sensitizing concepts (such as implicit negotiations or structural context). A
second, related objective is to describe the negotiations that employees engage in to attain
their ends. A third objective is to better understand the concept o f autonomy as it relates
to the rationalized work place. A fourth objective o f the study is to the substantive
understanding o f labor in fast food restaurants. While there have been a number o f
ethnographies of fast food restaurants, the diversity o f employee experience in fast food
restaurants has not been fully presented. McDonald’s and Burger King and similarly
structured restaurants account for the majority o f fast food ethnographies. These
restaurants tend to have a highly differentiated or specialized labor process. However,
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there are thousands o f fast food restaurants that are less differentiated. Likewise,
corporations operate some fast food restaurants while others are operated by individual
franchisees. There is considerable diversity for capital required for the purchase and
operation of a fast food restaurant. I believe that these variables may have an important
impact on the lived experience o f workers.
Choosing a Data Collection Method
Studies o f negotiated order require the richly detailed data that are generated by
qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews and participant observation. For a host of
reasons, I choose to collect my data through observations. Based on Morgan’s (1975)
study o f the negotiated order o f a factory, I conjectured that the negotiations that would
occur in a fast food restaurant would tend to be implicit rather than formally articulated.
Observing the negotiations that might occur in a highly rationalized environment would
necessitate careful analysis. Workers may not be entirely cognizant of the negotiations
that are occurring. Moreover, in order to understand the process of implicit negotiations I
would have to observe how workers interacted with each other and with management.
Observational data would allow me to understand what is important to workers and for
what they would and could negotiate. Reiter explains the advantages o f fieldwork over
interviews, “Sometimes answers do not jibe with what people actually do or think when
they are in a situation. For example, one worker I knew would insist on how much she
loved her job at Burger King, but when I saw her at work, she always looked bored and
unhappy” (1991:76). She also relates, “involvement in the situation allows researchers
the opportunity to learn something they didn’t know before” (1991:76). By taking
observations, I was in a position to record what occurred in the setting.
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Data Collection
Danny Jorgensen writes, “selection o f a setting is interrelated with problem being
studied” (1989:40). The objectives of this study and theoretical concerns guided my
selection o f setting. Grinders and Anna’s were selected, in part, through purposive
sampling, which is used “when a researcher wants to identify particular types of cases for
in-depth investigation” (Neuman 2000:198). I wanted my observations to come from
restaurants with reasonably small, undifferentiated crews, which were owned by
individual franchisees. Firstly, this type o f fast food restaurant has not been adequately
studied. Additionally, I believed that the processes o f negotiation would be easier to
observe and document in a simple organization, than in a more complex one. Although, I
infer that the social order of complex restaurants is maintained through negotiation, it will
be easier to document the processes of negotiation in complex restaurants once more
simplistic restaurants have been studied.
Convenience and feasibility also played a decisive factor in the selection o f sites.
As Jorgensen explains, “the selection of a setting for participant observation... is
contingent on (I) whether or not you can obtain access to the setting, (2) the range o f
possible participant roles you might assume, and (3) whether or not this role (or roles)
will provide sufficient access to phenomena of interest” (1989:41). My biography led me
to two franchises. Over a period of a number of years, I have been employed by four
different Grinders franchisees. I have spent over six thousand hours working at six
different restaurants in very different environments. During my career at Grinders, I was
a sociology student. I was always interested in trying to gain a scientific understanding of
my personal experiences. I kept a daily journal o f my experiences during my most recent
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tenure, where I was employed full time for a little under a month, in the summer o f 2001.
I placed entries in it at the end of each shift. This journal provides the bulk o f my data
from Grinders. Given m y deep immersion into the world o f Grinders I have access to data
that may otherwise be unobtainable. This deep immersion is important because, the
ability to reach the hidden details of implicit negotiations is crucial to the success o f the
study. Norm Denzin explains how a researcher may achieve this goal, “Because the
covert act is so difficult to penetrate, I have advocated the use of introspectiveinvestigator accounts o f the self in process. Such accounts provide the basic source of
data on the covert features of the public act” (1978:15).
As an insider, I have been able to understand processes o f negotiation that may have
remained hidden to an outsider. My decision to is not unorthodox. Jorgensen writes, “the
researcher already may be a participant before deciding formally to conduct research in
the setting” (1989:41). Additionally, David Hayano relates “some auto-ethnographers
worked at various jobs before or even during their careers as professional social
scientists, and later analyzed their experiences” (1979:100).
Observing a second franchise deepened my perspective and increased the
generalizability o f the study. Obtaining access to a particular milieu can be very
problematic. A number o f researchers who have studied fast food restaurants have
reported difficulty in gaining entrée (Leidner 1993; Reiter 1991; Royle 2000).
Fortunately, I am acquainted with a franchisee who allowed me to be a semi-employee at
his fast food restaurant named Anna’s. Fred allowed me to perform job tasks such as
cleaning and some food preparation. I observed Anna’s on twelve different occasions for
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over eighty hours, in the fall o f 2001. The employees knew that I was conducting
research, so I was able to ask them questions.
Ethnographers usually do not have the ability to state with any degree o f statistical
accuracy their confidence in the generalizability of their sample. Denzin explains.
The naturalistic observer seldom can specify with precise
detail the universe o f interactive relationships he wishes to
generalize to. He takes several approaches to the problem.
He m ay... locate himself in a situation where the joint act
occurs and argue that his sample is dravm from the
behaviors of all people who pass through this situation...”
(1978:19).
The two restaurants represent a venue where one is able to observe what may occur in a
fast food restaurant. While, I maintain that there is a tremendous diversity in the lived
experience o f fast food employees, there are limits on that diversity. Franchised fast food
restaurants are based on a rationalized plan. A single restaurant in a franchise will share a
similar labor process, similar structuring o f hierarchy, and similar equipment with all
other restaurants within the franchise. In as much as every Grinders restaurant where I
have been employed is distinct in some ways there are many commonalties. For instance,
franchisees instruct their employees to slice the rolls in the same way. Most employees
wear roughly equivalent uniforms within the franchise. Each restaurant owned the same
brand o f tomato sheer. By definition, there are important similarities in fast food
restaurants of the same chain. Consequently, most franchised fast food restaurants will
share some common experiences. In addition to arguing that all fast food restaurants
(regardless o f chain) share some common features, it is important to note the
“theoretically relevant features” o f the restaurants that I observed (Denzin 1978b: 19). For
instance, the restaurants that I observed are located in large cities, they are owned by a
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husband and wife; they have relatively small crews (under tw^enty employees). Relevant
theoretical features are identified throughout the analysis.
Difficulties and Limitations
Each type o f methodology carries with it certain intrinsic limitations. Auto
ethnography and participant observation are no exception. There is some debate over the
degree to which qualitative social scientists should be aware o f how their personal
biography impinges on their interpretations (Gubrium and Holstein 1997). My
biographical relationship to the subject is significant. Whatever biases arose from the
closeness o f biography to the setting at Grinders should be off set by my distance from
the setting at Anna’s. Conversely, whatever relevant data I was unable to uncover at
Anna’s due to my outsider status was corrected by my insider status at Grinders. In short,
by using two types of observational data I surmise that the problems associated with
either type of observation will be off set. Moreover, it should be noted that this work is
not an exercise in praxis. I did not begin with the intention of improving the lives of
workers. This study is simply a negotiated order analysis o f simple fast food restaurants.
Therefore, feelings of sympathy or camaraderie will have little influence on my findings
or conclusions.
There is also some difficulty in the actual recording o f observations at fast food
restaurants (Reiter 1991; Royle 2000). It is often difficult to take notes in hectic
environments. I corrected for this problem by recording my observations shortly after
leaving the field. While I cannot attest to the absolute veracity o f quotations and
descriptions, in each case they are very close to what actually occurred, any distortions
are most likely insignificant.
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Ethical Issues
There are a number o f ethical issues that arise when observing human subjects. These
non-mutually exclusive issues include, the need to protect subjects from legal, physical,
and emotional harm; the need to preserve the anonymity or confidentiality o f the
subjects; to obtain informed consent; and to not misrepresent oneself in the field
(Neuman 2000). These ethical issues are based on not causing harm to the people who
provide scientists with data. The non-controversial nature of this study and the concerted
effort to maintain confidentiality have protected my subjects from any reasonable
possibility of harm. Observations were taken at Anna’s after receiving approval from the
UNLV Social/Behavioral Institutional Review Board on October 31, 2001. After
submitting my request to observe Anna’s I submitted a revision to my original protocol
requesting permission to analyze my biographical data. Many identifying characteristics
have been altered or suppressed. For instance, the names of the restaurant, employees,
and franchisees have been changed. It is sincerely believed that none of the data
presented here are o f a seriously controversial or damaging nature. In many parts, the
data relate to my own personal experience as an employee at a fast food restaurant. As
mentioned above, working at Grinders is a substantial aspect o f my biography. Criticisms
of a privileged ethnographer obtaining data from a margninalized group are not relevant
here.
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CHAPTER 4

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATED
ORDER OF A FAST FOOD
RESTAURANT
In this chapter, I will apply the negotiated order perspective to fast food restaurants.
While the social order o f the fast food industry is subject to negotiation at many levels
and amongst a myriad of different actors, this analysis will focus on the negotiations
between coworkers and franchisees. I will begin by introducing the site o f the
negotiation, including the general features o f each restaurant and the specific actors. The
chapter will then move to discuss the cast o f a typical fast food restaurant and what their
individual motivations and strategies may be. Next, the essential aspects o f negotiations
will be considered including strategies, the negotiation context, structural context, and
temporal aspects. The chapter concludes with an analysis o f the specific issues that were
negotiated in the restaurants. The issues are separated into two types, external (including
wages, scheduling, and security) and internal (including job task assignment and the
definition o f deviance). While the point o f view o f the franchisees will be taken into
account, this analysis focuses on the perspective o f individual workers.
A Tale o f Two Franchises
This research is largely based on my personal experiences and observations at two
nationally franchised fast food restaurants. Both franchises are less uniform than
McDonald’s (Jackie and Sculle 1999). In both locations the franchisor seemed to exercise
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less control than what Royle described at McDonald’s (2000). Grinders specializes in
long sandwiches, commonly referred to as submarines, heroes, hoagies, or in this case
grinders. Anna’s specializes in ice cream, but also presents a menu of hamburgers,
hotdogs, fried chicken, and french fries. Both Grinders and Anna’s are less differentiated
than the McDonald’s or Burger King restaurants that have been studied by other
researchers (Reiter 1991; Leidner 1993; Royle 2000). The relatively simple division o f
labor allows for a more clear portrayal o f the negotiation o f social order. Although these
restaurants are less complex than some fast food franchises, they still operate according
to a uniformly rational model. By outlining the salient features of the structural and
negotiation contexts, we can achieve a sense o f how the social order of the fast food
restaurant is achieved through cooperation amidst competition. The following will
describe the setting, and the cast, o f each location. Afterwards, I will present a more
general description o f the types of actors, their motivations, abilities, and their position
vis-à-vis other actors.
Grinders
The location where much of my auto-ethnographic data is based is a mature
restaurant in a commercial center o f a large northeastern city. The restaurant is located in
a freestanding building within walking distance o f a number o f hotels, businesses, and
other entities with a high number o f employees. Located in a dense commercial location
it did not have a drive through window. The restaurant was usually busy between 11:00
AM and 2:30 PM on weekdays. After lunch (about 2:30 PM) and weekends were
relatively slow. However, conventioneers at the nearby hotels would sporadically
supplement the restaurants business.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

62

At Grinders, customers ordered from an employee who would fix the sandwich or
salad. All o f the materials for sandwich construction were located in front o f the
employee. Who would prepare the order and either receive payment or pass the wrapped
item to the person at the register. There are three principle job tasks; food preparation
(such as slicing vegetables, mixing tuna fish and mayonnaise, etc.), cleaning, and
customer service (constructing sandwiches, and operating the cash register). During busy
periods there would be four or five workers continually taking customer orders while
another employee or more likely James (the franchisee) or Kiran (James’ wife and the
manager) stayed on the cash register. The workers labored under confined conditions.
Frequently, there were too many or too few well-trained employees working during the
busy periods. Whenever the crew was short staffed, the employees who were present
would attempt to compensate for their missing compatriots. Whenever too many people
were working at one time, it would be difficult for the employees to maneuver around
each other. During busy lunches, the line o f customers would stretch to the entrance.
Employees would struggle to prepare food items around their coworkers and to isolate
the voice o f their individual customer from the cacophony of voices. When James was
present, he would usually operate the cash register; otherwise, Kiran would receive
payment. When business was slow, the same employee who filled the customer’s order
would take money from the customer.
The crew was ethnically and racially diverse; it consisted o f two franchisees, three
core employees, and a fluid stock o f periphery, less dependable characters. A core
member may be defined as one who is capable of performing most of the routine tasks
and has worked for a relatively long amount o f time. An indication o f core status might
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be if an employee is asked to help train new employees. The core members included two
twenty-year old Puerto Rican college students named Juanita and Maria; an eighteen-year
old high school student o f mixed racial background named Shawn; an Indian thirty
something named James who owned the restaurant and his wife Kiran who managed the
restaurant. Shawn, Maria, and Juanita were able to do almost all o f the tasks that were
required to run the restaurant. Due to their centrality, they held a distinct position in
negotiations. The restaurant would be far less profitable for James and Kiran were it not
for the presence o f the core workers. Moreover, the core workers relieved Kiran and
James of a great deal of the worry over the mundane details o f restaurant management.
An essential feature of core employee status is that core employees effectively exercise
authority over peripheral employees in the absence o f the franchisee. However, for all
their competence, this particular restaurant simply could not function effectively on the
labors of the core figures alone. A constantly changing pool of periphery employees
contributed to the restaurant. During my month long tenure (including me) four people
resigned, (one of whom Kiran claims that she was about to fire), and one was fired (the
worker claimed that she was about to resign). In the same time period four people were
hired. The periphery employees could be divided into two groups, the competent, and the
incompetent. O f course, this is a sliding scale; employees can be relatively useful or
useless (some employees were so incompetent that they became a physical obstacle) to
their co-workers. A competent peripheral employee may be peripheral due to part-time
status or having only been employed for a brief period o f time (three employees at
Grinders fit this description). An incompetent peripheral employee is simply one who for
whatever reason is o f little usefulness to coworkers or management. An actor’s status as a
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core or periphery worker has an important affect on the workers position in the ongoing
negotiations.
A crew may change over time. According to one core employee, James had originally
run the restaurant with enthusiasm, but over the years, he came to be less and less
concemed with the daily operation o f this location. Perhaps, his other Grinder restaurant
was a distraction or maybe he was slowly burning out. Whatever the cause, James did not
present himself as someone who identified with his franchise. I never witnessed even a
hint of the corporate ideology that has been reported by other ethnographers (Reiter
1991). There was some concern that he might sell the restaurant. The Grinders restaurant
was well worn. I presume the equipment was purchased when James first bought the
restaurant was fairly beaten up. The walk in freezer appeared to be in constant danger o f
failure. The food disposal broke down periodically. The schedule was often posted a few
days late or not at all. We were usually out of some menu items. James’ lack of
enthusiasm was of central importance to the negotiations. The employees who sought to
negotiate implicitly or explicitly for there own benefit from their own position interpreted
his position. The core employees tended to be somewhat extroverted and seemed to feel
quite comfortable in expressing their concerns. In fact, the extroverted behavior extended
into other spheres o f behavior that had nothing to do with jockeying for preferable job
tasks or scheduling. Shawn would loudly announce the arrival o f his birthday or his
displeasure with a given shift. Maria and Shawn might have a conversation about their
home lives. As the employees felt comfortable expressing themselves, they often made
their motivations known as easily as any other aspect o f their life that they felt sharing
with the group. This ease with their surroundings influenced the pursuit of their interests.
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Anna’s
The Anna’s restaurant is located on the comer o f an intersection in a freestanding
building complete with a sizable parking lot and drive through window. The restaurant
has a large dining area, an area for the preparation o f desert food that is within customer’s
view and a grill and deep fryer in the kitchen. Additionally, there is a break room and
storage area. The restaurant is located near a residential area in a large city. Anna’s
business is largely comprised o f the families in the surrounding residential area. Given
the restaurant’s heavy emphasis on traditional summertime desserts, the weather is an
important component o f the structural context o f the social order. The volume of business
or rather the franchisee’s interpretation o f the volume o f business is directly related to the
terms of negotiation. The observations were made during the off-season. The crew had
already been reduced to Fred, the franchisee; his wife, Cary; two core employees, Sandra
and Dianne; and two part-time workers named John and Mike.
While Grinders seemed to be a portrait of constant strife and fluidity, Anna’s was far
more static. The schedule did not change substantially from week to week. The crew was
stable; there was no turnover during my observations. Fred, who unlike James, was not
divided between two locations was able to devote his full attention to the maintenance o f
the restaurant. His near constant presence significantly reduced the autonomy of the
employees. Sandra and Dianne were so overwhelmingly competent that they did not have
any difficulty serving the customers according to the established routine. The literature
on routinzed labor tends to focus on large operations that have a highly differentiated
labor force. This restaurant, which during the busy season may become highly
differentiated, was operating with a reduced crew. During the occasional busy period, a
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single employee may have to perform the work o f two or three employees. This was
possible because the franchisee and the workers had honed their skills to the point where
they could seamlessly work with each other. As with any fast food restaurant, the labor
process at Anna's is highly routinzed. There is a very specific procedure for each menu
item. Large parties would arrive; one worker would take the order while the other would
prepare it. One worker would go to the kitchen to grill or fry the dinner foods while the
other would prepare the dessert items. The worker who finished first would package the
food. The clockwork operations stood in stark contrast to the near chaos o f Grinders.
The Cast
Individuals have their own motivations for entering the restaurant. These motivations
may be similar or disparate. Likewise, actors may be in conflict or in allegiance with each
another. Confusing the situation is that the same two individuals who are working
together for one end may be conflict over another. Two employees who are cooperating
to close the restaurant on time may be in conflict over who will receive a certain day off.
The individuals are existential selves, each with their own motivations that may include
rational and extra-rational desires. These desires may shift and change with the situation.
A number of structural factors such as regulations, the weather, the economy, and cultural
values affect the milieu. The motivations, emotions, and social skills of the actors as well
as their interpretation of the structural factors influence the negotiation context. The
franchisee and the employees form the core of the social order. In addition to the
franchisee and the employees, there is an endless succession o f competitors, property
owners, suppliers, regulatory agents, customers, and the franchisee and its
representatives, who each make their presence felt as they bargain for their interests.
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The Franchisee
The franchisee stands at the center of negotiations in the social order o f the fast
food restaurant. The franchisee must interact, directly or indirectly, with regulatory
agencies, property owners, competitors, customers, employees, and the franchisor. If the
franchisee is to be successful then all o f the proceeding actors (with the exception o f the
competition) must be satisfied. Ultimately, all decisions and all actions are her or his
responsibility and she or he retains immediate authority over what transpires. Corporate
mandates can be ignored, irate customers can be refused service, insubordinate
employees can be dismissed, and the board o f health can be ignored. However, if a
franchisee wants to keep her or his franchise, retain customers, maintain a crew, and
avoid legal sanction, the franchisee must pacify all o f the relevant actors. In the unstable
environment of the restaurant, customers and employees must feel that they are receiving
enough from the interaction for them to remain in the interaction. The restaurant depends
on some actors individually (such as the franchisor or the board of health) or collectively
(in the case o f customers or employees).
In order to achieve her or his goals, a franchisee must interpret the demands o f the
people with whom she interacts. Myriad questions confront franchisees. What will a
particular health inspector allow? How trustworthy are the employees? How competent
are they to run the restaurant without supervision? How closely should the company line
on prices, formulas, and decor be followed? How much will customers pay for a small
order of french fries? How long will they wait for a milk shake? How much meat do they
expect on their submarine sandwich? As the franchisee interprets the various demands
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and predicts the most probable, actions o f the individuals in question, the franchisee must
then attempt to minimally satisfy all parties concerned.
The Employees
Collectively, the employees are an integral component o f the restaurant. With the
possible exception o f restaurants that have very few customers, a franchisee cannot exist
without help. The franchisee must interpret what employees will and will not do. A
franchisee cannot make claims on employees that are out o f line with the majority o f their
expectations. Individually, however, a single employee may be utterly replaceable. Given
the virtual absence o f unions in fast food restaurants in the United States, fast food
employees are an atomized group. Fast food employees are just as likely to be in conflict
with each other as they are to be in conflict with management. The interchangeability,
which ostensibly weakens fast food workers, might also increase their power. In as much
as they can be replaced easily, frequently, they may replace one fast food job with
another. Since the job offers an employee little in the way of formal training or
recognized skills, a worker who has been successful in obtaining one fast food job can
usually expect to be capable o f gaining another. The significance o f this fact is that
depending on the structural context (the unemployment rate, or the number o f low skill
jobs) a franchisee may have to compete with other employers. If a franchisee consistently
offers his employees less in the way o f wages or scheduling flexibility than do other
employers in the immediate surroundings, the franchisee may find her or his restaurant
suffering from a shortage of labor. Conversely, if there are few options for alternative
employment, an employer may be able to make greater claims on his or her employees.
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Like franchisees, fast food employees must assess the structural and the negotiation
context if he or she is to be triumphant. Employees interpret the franchisee’s desires, his
or her value to the franchisee, the various biases and proclivities o f the employer, and
what can and cannot be negotiated with the franchisee. A franchisee that does not allow
employees to use the telephone may allow them to have visitors. A core employee may
be allowed to use the telephone while a peripheral employee may not.
As mentioned above, employees negotiate vertically (with management) and
horizontally (with co-workers). There are a number of issues where co-workers will be in
direct or indirect involvement with each other. For instance, in some restaurants, co
workers may have to negotiate the assignment of job tasks. Workers may be left to decide
who will prepare vegetables, wait on customers, or clean the toilets. Scheduling issues, in
terms of who gets to work when and who gets the most hours may bring workers into
direct conflict or cooperation. Co-worker negotiation is exemplified by the common
practices o f “switching schedules” or having another worker “cover” for one who wishes
to take a given day off. The agreement to do this is invariably worked out through some
form of explicit or implicit negotiation. For instance, many years ago, one August
evening, some friends of mine came in to visit me while I was working. They were going
to see a movie in a nearby theatre. It was the end of the summer; I was tired o f working,
and anticipating the arrival o f a substantial student loan check. In short, I really wanted to
‘blow o ff work and go to the movie. I could not afford to simply quit, nor would I walk
out on an employer who I personally liked. I was there with two co-workers, one who
was scheduled to work until 11:00 PM; the other was due to leave five minutes ago.
Neither had been trained to close the restaurant. That was my job. I could not trust the

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

70

one scheduled to work until 11:00 PM to manage the restaurant alone. My only hope was
to convince the worker who was about to leave to cover the shift for me. I asked him if he
would like to increase his hours. He informed me that he would not. I offered to pay him
ten dollars on top of the extra three hours wages that he would earn while I was at the
movie. Deal. This is a simple example o f explicit co-worker negotiation. Notice that the
features of the negotiation context such as the role o f emotions and personal ties (not
wanting to cause harm to my employer) trust (not trusting to leave my co-worker alone).
Structural features (the presence o f financial aid) also impinged on the negotiation
context.
Successful employees are able to read the structural context and discern how it might
affect the negotiation context. An employee who knows that there are a number o f other
similar jobs in the immediate vicinity may be able to claim more for herself than an
employee working in an area plagued with a dearth of similar jobs. An employee must
also be able to interpret the negotiation context. For instance, the emotions that are a part
of any social environment may affect the negotiations at any given time. An employee
who is in search of a raise or increased hours must interpret the optimal time to initiate
negotiations with the franchisee.
The Significant Extras
In addition to the employees and employers, there are a number o f other actors who
take their part in the ongoing negotiations o f the social order. Customers, franchisors,
competitors, and regulatory agents (health inspectors) each pursuing different interests
enter the negotiations. They are considered extras here because on any given day they
may not actually negotiate directly or individually with either the franchisor or the
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employees. First, there are the customers. Without enough customers, a restaurant will
not be economically viable. While the customers, as a whole, drastically influence the
social order, an individual customer has relatively little affect on the ongoing
negotiations. If a single customer does not agree with the price a hamburger, the quality
of the patty, or the length of wait, that single customer may negotiate ‘with his feet’ and
never be missed. However, customers will have to be reckoned with if they all take a
similar stance to an action by a franchisee or franchisor. Customers form a negotiating
block in the ongoing incremental negotiations. In order to meet their goals, the franchisee
and the franchisor attempt to interpret and meet the customer’s expectations. Their
recognition o f customer demands significantly influences the negotiations. Issues that can
and cannot be bargained for often depend on what employers’ believe customers expect.
The health inspector affects the social order. On a typical day, the health inspector is
unlikely to be directly involved with the restaurant. However, this official’s judgement
may have dire consequences for the franchisee and employees alike. If the health
inspector finds regulations being ignored, the inspector may sanction the franchisee. This
is a threat that Fred and Kiran, two franchisees thousands o f miles apart, took very
seriously. It can be assumed that most restaurateurs feel an ethical obligation to maintain
sanitary conditions, but the government, in the person o f the health inspector decides
precisely what the standards will be. A single franchisee has little power in relation to the
health inspector. I witnessed little in the way o f negotiation between health inspectors and
franchisees. The franchisees had nothing to offer health inspectors save their compliance
to the impersonal social order. The impersonal social order that is enforced by the health
inspector is itself a matter of explicit negotiation. Much like the governmental regulations
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of the liquor industry, at some level, the laws that regulate restaurants, (or the laws that
regulate the regulators) must be negotiated (Denzin 1977, 1978a). For instance, lobbyists
working on behalf o f the restaurant industry may influence the social order.
Like the health inspector, the franchisor sets the terms of the specific interaction.
Many franchisees seek to ensure a level o f uniformity by having periodic inspections of
the franchisee. Interactions between franchisees and franchisors are highly variable. In
some instances, franchisors maintain a great deal o f control over franchisees; in other
cases franchisees operate with relative autonomy. The terms o f the interaction are set at
the time o f the contract signing. Potential franchisees have the option o f selecting from a
large pool o f franchisees in order to find the arrangement that best suits his or her desires.
The two franchisees under consideration here maintained a relatively high degree o f
autonomy from the franchisor. The corporation periodically inspected both restaurants,
but these inspections did not seem to carry the weight of the health inspections. While the
authority o f the health inspector clearly weighed on the minds o f Kiran and Fred neither
franchisee expressed concern for the views o f the franchisor. This lack of concern may
partially be explained by the fact that many o f the interests o f the franchisee and the
franchisor coincide. Both franchisee and franchisor want sales to be high. In addition to
the name and the product, the franchisee purchased the formula for operation, it is only
logical that the franchisee makes use o f that formula, and with negligible exception they
did. However, there are instances when the motives o f franchisor’s and franchisees are in
conflict (Royle 2000; Schlosser 2001).
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Aspects o f Negotiations
To examine the issues that may be negotiated in a franchised fast food restaurant, we
must understand some o f the essential features o f negotiation. First, negotiations occur
between actors who are attempting to satisfy varying desires. Each actor comes to the
negotiations with different motivations. Actors with similar goals may attempt to achieve
their goals through different means. We must be mindful of the negotiation context that
surrounds the interactions. Unlike rational choice models o f negotiation, this analysis is
mindful o f the role that emotions play in influencing the unfolding negotiations.
Likewise, we cannot lose our awareness o f the structural context that contains the
negotiation context. Finally, the negotiated order perspective maintains that the
negotiations over social order are never final, rather social order is fluid and must be
continually renegotiated with changes in the structural and negotiation contexts, as well
as when actor’s motivations change or when different individuals enter a milieu (Strauss

197%L
The Structural and Negotiation Contexts
The structural context of negotiations refers to the structural features that affect
negotiations (Strauss 1978). Structure does not strictly determine the outcome of
negotiations. However, an actor’s interpretation o f the social structural, coupled with the
actor’s interpretation o f the other actor’s interpretation o f the social structure wields a
great influence on the negotiations. The structural context of a restaurant includes but is
certainly not limited to the size of the restaurant, the volume o f business, the weather,
cultural beliefs (racism, consumerism, sexism, etc.), the presence o f competitors, the
laws, the formal organization of restaurant, and so forth. In order to consider the
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negotiations of any milieu we must understand how actors interpret the relevant structural
features. The negotiation context refers to all things that directly affect the negotiation of
a social order (Strauss 1978). The negotiation context includes the structural features and
the individuals’ motivations, values, strategies, and emotions.
Emotions
Emotions play a large role in the ongoing negotiations. Employees and franchisees
often work at a frantic pace, for long hours, in tight quarters near hot fryers, grills, and
ovens. In restaurants that are not highly differentiated (like Grinders and Anna’s) the
labor process may combine the repetition of an assembly line, with the degradation and
exasperation of customer service work, and the sometimes-nauseating characteristics o f
janitorial work. One can imagine how a fast food restaurant might become an emotionally
charged environment. Two employees may find that they would like to fill the same
niche in the ecosystem. A worker’s compensation dispute can boil beneath the façade of
an ostensibly harmonious worker-employee relationship. As the actors cooperate and
compete with each other, intense feelings of admiration, loyalty, and resentment may
develop. These emotions are a continually varying element that must be interpreted and
adjusted to if the actors are to cooperate with each other. Emotional issues have a drastic
effect on how people interact with each other. There are times to negotiate and there are
times to avoid interaction. For instance, Shawn, a day after an argument about the
schedule with James was incredibly reluctant to make work-related suggestions to his
employer. Conversely, Shawn wisely pressed James for a raise while the four of us were
celebrating the most profitable day o f the year. A symbiotic maintenance o f the social
order requires sensitivity to the emotions of one’s fellow members in an emotionally
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charged environment. Affecting the emotional context is the conflation o f primary and
secondary relationships.
In many ways, fast food restaurants are the epitome of the process of rationalization
described by Weber. These restaurants have deskilled the labor process to a point where
employees are said to have become interchangeable (Reiter 1991). Impersonality is one
of the defining marks of rationalization in general and fast food restaurants in particular.
However, impersonality is not a factor at all fast food restaurants. Despite rationalization,
high turnovers rates, comparatively low pay, competition and atomization, market
relations have not completely erased moral relations. Both employees (usually core
employees) and the franchisee often come to share a history and an interpersonal
understanding that defies the popular notion that impersonal relations mark fast food
employment. Some workers become friends. A franchisee might come to empathize with
long-term employees. Workers do not necessarily allow their feelings o f camaraderie or
intimacy to occlude their personal desires. To the contrary I have yet to see a conflation
o f primary and secondary relationships result in either a worker or an employee seriously
departing from their own position simply because they may “like” or “care for” another
person in the restaurant. One of the features o f negotiations in a simple franchised fast
food restaurant is that individuals often pursue their own personal interests in a
contentious or competitive fashion, with people they intimately understand. There are a
number of different strategies that actor’s may employ in their negotiations.
Strategies o f Negotiation
Two individuals who are in structurally similar positions may attempt to achieve
widely divergent goals. One employee may wish to increase his autonomy to improve his
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individual working conditions. Another may be primarily motivated to earn as much
money as possible. The specific strategies o f the employees and the franchisee depend on
their individual interpretations o f the negotiation context. David Altheide explains.
The crucial element in negotiating order, however is the
essential relationship between an actor’s situational
definition and the social world within which it emerges.
The context does not automatically direct or lead actors to
one course o f action rather than to another; there always is
more than one possible course of action (emphasis in
original 1988:343).
If an actor is going to be successful in getting what he or she wants from the social order,
he or she may calculate his or her actions. Franchisees and employees interpret the
negotiation context. Sometimes actors will articulate their desires and what they are
willing to give in return. Other times, actors will choose to engage in implicit
negotiations. The decision depends, in part, on the personal proclivities o f the individual.
Some people prefer explicit negotiations, while others choose to negotiate implicitly
through action. The next section will examine some strategies that franchisees employ in
their negotiations with their employees. Employee strategies will be considered in the
section describing the typology o f negotiated issues.
Franchisee Strategies for Negotiating
with Employees
A single franchisee, operating one or two restaurants may not have access to the
human resource specialists. While the Burger Kings and McDonald’s o f the industry can
invest a great deal of resources to placate employees, this task takes on a different
meaning for individual franchisees. Reiter describes how Burger King uses an industrial
psychology to encourage their employees to work hard for little pay (1991). Eric
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Schlosser reports that McDonald’s uses transactional analysis to motivate employees
without offering material rewards. Schlosser relates, “that managers are trained in a
technique called “stroking,” wherein managers give “deliberate praise, and recognition
that many teenagers don’t get at home. Stroking can make a worker feel that his or her
contribution is sincerely valued. And it’s much less expensive than raising wages or
paying overtime” (2001:74). Depending on the individual proclivities o f the franchisee
can use a sort o f layman’s human relations theory o f management may be used to smooth
over the effects o f the scientific management on the psyches o f employees.
Both Fred and James are willing to negotiate with increase the wages of core
employees that they wish to retain. Fred offered overtime to his core employees and I
witnessed James give an hourly raise to a core employee. Unlike some o f the managers at
some corporate fast food restaurants, the franchisees at Anna’s and Grinders maintain
enough autonomy from the franchisor to decide how and if they want to negotiate with
industrial psychology or human relations theory to supplement the scientific management
intrinsic to the fast food restaurant. This decision depends largely on the franchisee. I
never witnessed Fred attempt to use any technique that resembled stroking. James,
however, did not appear to share Fred’s candor. This is not to say that James is dishonest,
but rather, James (who is rumored to have a BA in psychology) is willing to use the
emotionality o f the negotiation context to his advantage.
The following situations exemplify how James maintained the social order, in part by
knowing when to mollify an angry employee. Saturdays at Grinders are supposed to be
easy days. This expectation is a part of the negotiation context. This section o f the city is
very quiet on the weekends. Kiran and James react to the structural context by reducing
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the number o f crew over the weekend. One Saturday I was scheduled to work from open
to close with Juanita and Maria. It was supposed to be an easy day. I expected to have
two highly competent co-workers to help me serve few customers. Unfortunately, there
was a convention and my highly competent co-workers were sick and at home. The
conventioneers, stationed in a hotel near the restaurant had few culinary options over the
weekend when many restaurants were closed. At 11:00 AM, 1 called James and Kiran
requesting help. James claimed that he would be at the restaurant at 11:30 AM. The
conventioneers continued to enter the restaurant. I processed the customers successfully,
but the restaurant looked as if 1 had been playing with hand grenades. Discarded wax
paper covered the floor. The dining area needed to be bused. The sink was overflowing
with dishes. James and Kiran kept failing to show up. My anger deepened steadily. By
12:30 PM, James and Kiran finally appeared. Kiran immediately set to work. James
assessed the situation. Unfortunately, the rush had subsided, making it seem as though 1
had exaggerated the number of customers that 1 had served. He did not chide me for not
working hard enough or for being sloppy. Instead, he decided to maintain the social order
by stating, “You did well for your first time alone.” He then read the register tape and
realized that 1 had been busy. James interpreted the situation, realized that 1 might be
somewhat angry about having had to work so hard without assistance. He modified his
original statement. “You did tremendous!” His articulated recognition worked to diffuse
my frustration. By interpreting the negotiation context, he preserved the social order by
encouraging me to remain at the restaurant.
Another example of a franchisee being mindful o f the emotions in the negotiation
context occurred when James wanted to alter the established work schedule. 1 had been
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working for ten days in a row with out a day off. While this would not seem out o f the
ordinary in some negotiation contexts, at this Grinders restaurant, a feature o f the
negotiation context was that employees expected to receive regular time off. I was greatly
looking forward to next four days. It was Thursday and I was not scheduled to work
Friday, Saturday, or Tuesday. The negotiation context had changed in that some workers
were continually calling off. James interpreted the change in the negotiation context and
decided that he needed to increase the hours o f another worker to make up for the
potentially tmant workers. James decided that 1 should work some extra shifts. 1 too had
interpreted not just the absence o f workers in the negotiation context, but also that James
might ask me to sacrifice my time off, my excitement dissolved into trepidation as the
shift wore on. James interpreted my emotional state when he approached me toward the
end o f my shift.
James:

Tomorrow you get a day off. You deserve it. What, is it your first in ...

Eric:

Three weeks.

James:

Five years.

[Restrained chuckles all around]
He then proceeded to tell me that 1 would have to work on Saturday and for a half
shift on Tuesday. 1 could have protested. However, 1 did not want to be fired. Moreover,
it was exceedingly difficult to argue with a boss who was demonstrably sympathetic to
my plight. Lastly, emotionally, it was easier to accept an easy Saturday shift because 1
was relieved about not being asked to work for an eleventh day in a row. James was
successful in negotiating for his desires, in that he was able to fix the deficiency in the
schedule, without having an employee resign (an ever-present danger). James was
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successful, in part because he correctly read the emotional elements o f the negotiation
context and compensated for this in his negotiation strategy. This interaction, as we will
see later, represents a negotiation in that I could very well have refused. Later I will relate
a similar instance where the employee decided not to accept an undesired shift.
The Temporal Aspects o f Negotiation
The analysis of the negotiated order o f fast food restaurants is based on the notion
that social order is continually negotiated. Issues that have been negotiated at one time
will most likely be renegotiated as the structural and negotiation contexts change. A
change in the unemployment rate, the actors, the laws, cultural beliefs, emotions and so
forth may present an opportunity or call for a renegotiation of specific issues. Since social
order is created through interaction, the social order may change with each set o f
negotiations. Employees who collaborate at one time may not cooperate in the future. A
tense employee-employer relationship may improve. Likewise, an amiable employeeemployer relationship may sour over time. Negotiations are usually conducted in the
shadow of previous negotiations. For instance, the employees at Grinders warned me
about the dangers o f being too flexible in terms o f scheduling. One day after I had agreed
to come in off o f the schedule one employee warned, “Now that you covered, he’ll
always expect you to .. .[it will be like] you need the day off, see Eric...” Oftentimes
issues are negotiated periodically, with the conclusion o f the negotiation holding until the
next time the issue comes up. For example, an employee may explicitly negotiate for a
higher wage. The negotiations presented below will illustrate how the social order
changes with the ongoing negotiations.
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The Negotiations
Within the social order o f the restaurant there are innumerable points that most be
compromised upon, from the schedule to the assignment o f job tasks to the definition of
deviance. This section will focus on employee-employer and employee-employee
negotiations. There are two main types of issues that may be negotiated, those that are
external (i.e. wages and the schedule) and those that are internal (i.e. job task
assignment). This section will examine what issues are negotiated for and what strategy
employees use to achieve their goals. Additionally, I will consider the nature of
autonomy and how it relates to negotiations in highly regulated environments.
External Issues
Under the heading o f external issues, I will include all issues that constitute the
economic rationale for obtaining a job, most notably, the wages, opportunity for
advancement, security, and the schedule. These issues must be worked out but do not
directly relate to the actual working conditions. The external issues are directly connected
to the ‘outside’ non-work lives o f employees. The external issues are among the most
critical of an employee’s life such as: whether or not an employee can move out o f her or
his house; is able to schedule time for college classes, another job, or a social life; or if he
or she will lose sleep because he or she is afraid of being laid off. These negotiations may
be particularly contentious because they have the gravest stakes for both employee and
franchisee.
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Worker Autonomy and Negotiations
Over External Issues
Autonomy refers to the freedom from employer control (Katz 1964). Autonomy may
take the form o f control over issues such as the schedule or job task assignment. The
notion o f autonomy relates to negotiations over external issues, in that workers who seek
to negotiate for increased wages, security, and hours, do so by explicitly or tacitly
sacrificing their personal autonomy. In some cases, the workers who have the most
autonomy are those who do not wish to earn more than minimum wage or work a full
(forty-hour or more) schedule. If an employee wishes to move from the periphery to the
core, she or he may have to sacrifice some personal freedom. An employee who wants as
many hours as possible may have to make some sacrifices in personal autonomy such as
being willing to work weekends or closing shifts. This same employee may also have to
be willing and able to satisfy the franchisee’s expectations. For example, the day after
Shawn received a raise, he was called upon to forfeit his scheduled day off to cover for
co-workers who had failed to show up. Conversely, employees who wish to receive very
little in the way of take home pay, advancement, and security can commonly maintain a
high level of autonomy. If the negotiation context includes a labor shortage, a worker
who cares little about external issues may demand quite a lot in terms o f autonomy (not
working weekends, not performing certain job tasks like cleaning the toilets). An
employer may concede some control to prevent the employee from leaving. However,
that same employee may be ‘let go’ when the negotiation context changes. Some
employees assess their personal situations and decide how much autonomy they should
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give up in order to have their material needs met. An employee who is dependent on his
or her position may be less willing to press for autonomy.
Wages
One o f the most salient issues to be negotiated in any work environment is the
employee wage rate. There is no escaping the fact that fast food labor is considered to be
among the least skilled jobs in the United States. Due to the low value placed on fast food
labor, workers have considerably depressed wages (Ritzer 1998). The Bureau of Labor
Statistics reports that in 2000 the mean hourly wage for fast food cooks was S6.78 per
hour and the mean wage for “Combined Food Preparation and Serving Workers,
Including Fast Food” was $6.84 (http://www.bls.gov/oes/2000/oes_35Fo.htm). To some
extent, the economic viability of fast food restaurants is predicated on the ability of
restaurants to reduce labor costs. The economic pressure to pay employees as little as
possible constitutes an important aspect o f the negotiation context. Employees do
exercise some agency over their wages. Although, there may be limits to what a
franchisee is willing to spend, the specific hourly wage o f each employee is subject to
implicit and explicit negotiation.
Implicit or indirect negotiation tended to be continual and imprecise (for more than
one issue at once). An employee could broker for increased wages by simply presenting
himself as a “good employee” that is to say a more competent, dependable, and
trustworthy employee. By not (openly) engaging in deviant activities, by agreeing to
substitute for truant coworkers, optimally performing job tasks and so forth an employee
may place herself in a position to command a pay increase without explicit negotiation.
For instance, when I was hired, I was informed that my initial wages was $6.00 per hour
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and that if I was competent I could expect a pay raise. As it turned out, I was able to
utilize my considerable Grinders experience at this location, to such an extent that I soon
became recognized as a relatively useful employee and coworker. At the end of the first
week, James informed me that I would be receiving a raise o f S0.75 per hour. I had not
asked for a raise. However, by satisfactorily performing my duties, I successfully (and
unintentionally) bargained for a pay increase.
At this point, the reader might legitimately ask: How does this constitute implicit
negotiation? Common sense would predict that competent employees are better paid than
are incompetent employees. However, we must remember that in fast food restaurants (as
in any number o f work environments) workers choose to be ‘good’ employees. To
understand an employee’s decision to become competent we must consider the existential
position of the individual actor. First, the decision to become a competent employee is
not necessarily the same as the decision to retain one’s position. In some (but by no
means all) negotiation contexts, the labor pressures are such that even a relatively
incompetent or ‘poor’ employee may enjoy a surprisingly high degree o f job security. I
observed some employees who seemed to interpret the structural forces operating on the
restaurant, and decided that since they had little desire to gamer a small increase in
hourly pay, they would rather ‘slack o ff. Therefore, if a worker may be able to remain
employed without being a ‘model’ employee, workers who do attempt to meet what they
believe to be the franchisee’s expectations are making a choice to do so. I am not making
the argument that anyone can work well in fast food restaurants. Quite the contrary,
despite the highly rationalized labor process, becoming a model fast food employee is
very much an accomplishment. If a worker is to become a core or even a competent
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periphery member o f the organization, he or she must make the decision to do so. The
attempt to move from the periphery to the core requires an individual to interpret the
environment and the means necessary to achieve this goal. The industrious employee
must learn how to perform the various job tasks successfully and to get along with the
others, particularly the franchisee. This goal may be ‘easier said than done’ so to speak,
as not everyone is successful. For the purposes o f understanding how the social order o f a
franchised fast food restaurant is subject to negotiation, we can interpret the actions o f the
competent employee as one who is implicitly negotiating for increased wages by
choosing to be competent.
Negotiations over wages may also take place on an explicit level. Not all employees
who wish to receive an increase in their wages are willing to wait to be rewarded for their
silent efforts. Some employees, particularly those who see themselves as having achieved
a certain importance or core status within the restaurant may feel more comfortable
making their wishes known. The ultimate decision-maker is the franchisee. In the nonunionized and non-contractual fast food restaurant disagreements are often reduced to a
‘take it or leave it’ situation. The employer will interpret the situation as he wishes
regardless o f the structural context, and may choose to set the wages regardless of the
structural context. The decision not to negotiate is itself an act o f negotiation.
Correspondingly, the employee must then decide whether to stay or to leave, which is
also an act of negotiation.
A franchisee may decide that it is in her or his best interest to ‘work with’ an
employee who requests a pay raise. On a certain holiday. Grinders is traditionally busy
and is subsequently open later than usual. The predictably increased business is a part of
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the structural context. None of the core crewmembers wanted to work on this particularly
difficult evening. The individual motivations o f the workers form an aspect of the
negotiation context. James was not willing to give all o f them the night off. Although,
James was able to import one worker from another store, he still needed one more
worker. The unlucky candidate was Shawn, who parlayed his anger at being forced to
work when Maria and Juanita did not into a higher wage. After we finally finished
closing the restaurant at about midnight, James and Kiran took Shawn and I to dinner.
Shortly after our orders were taken, Shawn announced; “I need a raise!” He mentioned
that his pay should be eight dollars per hour. It came up that Juanita and Maria, who have
been with the restaurant longer, earn $8.00 per hour. Shawn related that the other core
members had received the holiday off last year (the fact that he had to work this holiday
two years in a row seemed to contribute to his resentment). Eventually, James relented to
Shawn’s request. In some negotiation contexts, an assertive employee may succeed in
bargaining for increased pay. This fact is demonstrated by Shawn, who was able to
steadily negotiate for wage increases until he was earning as much as employees who
were his senior in the restaurant. Although structural issues influence how much
employees can expect to earn, the actual pay may be subject to individual negotiations o f
an atomized work force and the franchisee.
Promotion
As with other industries, an offer o f a raise in wages may come with an increase in
responsibility. A franchisee may decide that if higher wages are to be paid, the increase in
outlay should come with a decrease in direct supervisory work for the franchisee.
Contrary to the common sense expectation that an employee will accept an opportunity
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for promotion, in a fast food restaurant the desirability o f such advancement is far from
guaranteed. One slow evening, Juanita explained to me that promotion was not a part o f
her plans at Grinders.
“I wouldn’t be a manager.”
“Why wouldn’t you be a manager Juanita?”
“Cause I had to do it full time, I wanted to do it part-time cause I wanted to go to
school.”
Juanita went on to relate that other managers experienced a significant reduction in
personal autonomy. She rejected an offer o f promotion because she feared that it would
be difficult to keep up her studies if she accepted the encroachment on personal
autonomy that comes with management. We can see that the terms o f promotion are the
subject of negotiation. Although the prospect o f increased pay was attractive, she was not
at the restaurant for wages alone. For her, autonomy (particularly her control o f the
schedule) was a stronger motivation for working at Grinders than the wages. This finding
is not surprising considering the relatively low expectations employees may have o f how
much they can actually earn at a fast food restaurant. Juanita was not the only employee
at Grinders to reject a promotion. One evening Shawn mentioned,
“After you left, when we went to [dinner], he [James] laid on me this offer to be
manager at Placid Hills [James’ second location].”
“Why didn’t you take it?”
“I’m not desperate yet. When I’ve got an apartment, I might want the ten an hour.”
Shawn, who still lived at home, was not sure that he needed the commitment o f full
time management. However, he would not rule out the possibility o f accepting a
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managerial position. If his personal circumstances changed, he may wish to take the
promotion. Again, we see that the personal motivations o f the actors impinge upon the
social order o f the restaurant. Moreover, one might infer that James has placed a limit on
how much an employee may earn without taking on a significant increase responsibility.
Of course, James’ offer comes because o f his interpretation o f Shawn as a competent and
trustworthy employee. James has interpreted his fiscal situation to be healthy enough to
delegate authority in exchange for increased labor expenditures. More likely than not. the
promotional offer was an expression o f his personal desire to decrease the personal strain
of owning two restaurants.
Security
In addition to negotiating for wage increases, the security of an employee’s position
may be subject to negotiation. Security refers to a state o f being insulated from the
fluctuations o f the market place. This may take the form o f security from being laid off or
security from drastic cuts in scheduled hours. The structural context o f some restaurants
includes a variable amount o f business throughout the year. For instance, some areas may
depend on the business of seasonal travelers or tourists; some areas become inhospitable
during the winter, and some restaurants specialize in items that have seasonal appeal. For
whatever reason some franchisees may find that it is in their best interest to close down
completely or drastically reduce the number o f employees during a slower season.
Presumably, most employees know o f the impending labor cuts. Employees may be
forced to implicitly negotiate for a position o f security or be laid o ff or have their hours
reduced. Those employees who only need the job for a brief time (like those who do not
need a wage increase) may opt to retain a periphery role, sparing themselves what they
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may consider undue effort or strain. Other employees may decide that it is in their best
interest to retain their position and their current schedule. Employees who wish to earn a
measure o f stability must decide to become as competent and trustworthy as possible.
The obvious reason for this is that, all things being equal, the franchisee will retain the
most competent employees during the periodic slowdowns in business. During
transitional periods, there can be an erratic flow o f business. Workers who have been
lulled to complacency will find that they are suddenly very busy. This transition can be
difficult and requires a high level o f competence. When a franchisee contracts her or his
labor force, it follows that the crew may find itself shorthanded. In order to avoid losing
customers, the shorthanded crew must perform especially well. The issue o f security is
likely to be negotiated implicitly, as workers who wish to remain on the staff and or have
their hours remain in tact will implicitly negotiate by demonstrating a high level of
competence. The negotiations over the issue o f security during slow times o f the year
may be affected by the emotions present in the negotiation context. When the negotiation
context includes a conflation of primary and secondary relationships between workers
and management, it may aid the cause o f an employee who wishes to negotiate for
increased job security. Despite the supposedly formal and impersonal relations that exist
in rationalized environments, members o f the restaurant may over time relate to each
other on a personal basis. This is not to say that workers and employees become friends
in any traditional sense of the word, but there may very well be a movement from market
to moral relations. While it is doubtful that the individual actors in a restaurant ever lose
sight of their personal interests, the conflation o f primary and secondary relations may
influence negotiations. For instance, it will be more difficult an employer to lay off an
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employee that he or she has come to know, than an employee who is less well known. In
other words, a franchisee is more likely to attempt to “take care” of a long time employee
than one with whom he or she has little emotional connection. I observed this tendency
both through out my personal career at Grinders and at Anna’s.
The Schedule
Perhaps one o f the most salient issues to be negotiated in a fast food restaurant is the
schedule. The possible flexibility o f scheduling is attractive to those with outside
commitments such as single mothers and students (Reiter 1991). Given the relatively
low-level of prestige, training, and money that can be derived from fast food employment
an adequate schedule may be a particularly salient issue. Two major themes circulate
around the issue o f scheduling. The first is the ability o f an employee to work around
other aspects of their life such as extracurricular activities, a second job, parental
responsibilities, and education. The second theme is the ability o f workers to gain enough
hours in order to be satisfied with one’s income. The following testimonies, presented by
Ivan Chamer and Bryna Shore Fraser (1984), exemplify the ability o f some fast food
employees to obtain acceptable work schedules. One respondent related:
I found my grades dropping because I was working 4 or 5
hours every school night and 8 or 9 hours on Saturday. I
talked to my manager and we decided that it would be best
for me to only work 4 hours during the school week, then
more on the weekends. Many of my working friends have
told me how fortunate I am to have such an understanding
manager and suitable hours. This has been my experience
working for both the company and a franchise (Chamer and
Fraser 1984: 138-139).
However, some workers are not so successful. One respondent offered this statement:
I need more hours and more money with three children.
They will give the people that don’t want to work more
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hours and the ones that want to work w on’t get any.
Something needs to be done or said (Chamer and Fraser
1984:129).
Some fast food workers are far more successful at obtaining schedules that they find
acceptable than others. Chamer and Fraser, in a survey o f over 4600 workers related:
a higher proportion of employees who have worked more
than two years are satisfied with the way they are scheduled
than are employees who have worked for a shorter length
o f time. Sixty percent of those who have worked more than
two years are satisfied compared to 53 percent and 44
percent for those employees who have worked 13-24
months and one year or less respectively (1984:48).
We may conjecture that the longer an employee remains at a single restaurant, the
stronger her or his bargaining position may become. Perhaps, as a worker remains at a
single location, he or she becomes more indispensable, trusted, and well regarded by the
person that sets the schedule. Additionally, we might conjecture that employers attempt
to negotiate for a stable workforce by providing competitive schedules.
Employees are not likely to obtain a desired schedule without implicit or explicit
negotiation. In the negotiated order of the fast food restaurant, workers do not necessarily
form a collective entity against management. An atomized labor force is just as likely to
be in competition with itself as it is to be in conflict with employers. Conflicts over which
employees get a schedule that is favorable to them is one area where we can see
employees in competition over an issue that is o f diminished importance to the manager.
If the schedule is filled with capable workers, who gets which days off is not of likely to
be of primary importance to most managers or franchisees. However, who receives what
day off can be o f great importance to the employees. Employees who are in a better
negotiating position will most likely have more control o f the schedule. The ability to
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control one’s schedule is an important area o f autonomy and may be a major reason why
some workers remain at a restaurant. This is evidenced by Juanita who asserted:
You can write your own schedule, that’s why I’m still here.
You see him [the franchisee James] ask me what days I’m
available.
Not everyone is in the same bargaining position when it comes to the hashing out who
will work when. Juanita explains:
Shawn doesn’t understand that we get to write our own
schedule because we’ve been here longer. He’s still in high
school. W e’re [her and Maria] are in college. Paul realizes
we’ve got to study.
The schedule was an essential issue at Grinders. James was at the center of
scheduling conflicts. About a week after the conflict over holiday scheduling, another
scheduling controversy arose as Shawn was scheduled to work on a Saturday, after he
had requested to not work weekends. In the past week, Shawn had worked a holiday that
he had requested to have off, and the following day he sacrificed his day off to cover for
three truant co-workers. Being told to work on Saturday was more than Shawn would
stand. He believed that he was being taken advantage o f because o f his willingness to be
versatile. Shawn confronted James. Shawn refused to work Saturday. James replied by
telling Shawn that he would let him go if he did not work on Saturday. Shawn, aware of
his value to the restaurant and believing that James was “bluffing,” refused to back down.
At this point, it seemed as though both men had drawn a line in the sand and now pride
and emotionality were eclipsing pure economic rationality. Presumably, Shawn resigning
would not be in the best interest of either man. James, running his restaurant with a small
and oftentimes unstable crew relied on Shawn, who despite being assertive is a very
competent employee. Shawn, on the other hand, certainly would not benefit from losing
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his job. The existing social order o f the restaurant depended on a resolution to this
conflict, yet neither party seemed willing to retreat.
Fortunately, Juanita, who had recently decided that she would like to purchase an
automobile, entered the negotiations. In order to reach her goal she would have to work
as many hours as possible. A few days before the stand off she began to badger James for
more hours. When Juanita saw that James had offered Shawn an ultimatum, and realizing
that Shawn would be fired before he or James would acquiesce, she intervened by
offering to work on Saturday. In this situation, the entrance of a third party into the
negotiations, allowed both actors to attain their goals without either having to ‘back
down’. Both James and Shawn maintained their pride without permanently sacrificing
their business relationship. It should be noted that Juanita was not operating on purely
selfish motivations. She did not want to see Shawn fired needlessly. The next day, when
she and I were working alone together (the day that she was covering for Shawn), she
asserted “I saved Shawn from getting fired.” When I contended that she was happy to
obtain his hours, she vehemently denied the charge. While I personally do not believe
that her offer to work Shawn’s shift and her desire to earn money to purchase an
automobile are completely independent o f each other, I do believe that she had acted with
concern for Shawn.
This incident reveals a number o f aspects o f the negotiation of social order in a fast
food restaurant. First, there is often a conflation of primary and secondary social roles.
Co-workers and employers all have a formal, economic basis for their interaction.
Ostensibly, actors in a highly routinzed or McDonaldized setting would have impersonal
economically defined relations with each other (Ritzer 1993:1998). Although the basis
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for the relationships among crewmembers is certainly economically defined, noneconomically rational feelings o f camaraderie tend to arise. These non-economically
rational feelings affect the negotiation context. People will have more than their own
personal goals in mind when they interact. Juanita’s willingness to cover Shawn’s
Saturday shift, (a day she usually did not like working) was most likely influenced by her
desire to earn more money and her desire to see Shawn remain employed at the
restaurant. Within a given setting, the motivations of individual workers can rarely be
reduced to a single motivation. Nor can social relationships be sharply defined, even in an
environment that has been subject to strict routinization.
Temporal Limits o f Negotiations
Over External Issues
The interaction o f the actors is influenced by a confluence o f dynamic motivations.
As the desires of individual actors change, like when Juanita decided that she wanted to
earn enough money to buy a car, these individuals may seek to renegotiate the social
order to reach their new goals. The social order must be renegotiated in response to
changes in the negotiation context. This phenomenon occurs in fast food restaurants as
the structural forces, like the economy or the weather may affect the volume of the
business of the restaurant, thus changing the negotiation context. This is clearly
exemplified when a given shift is far slower than anticipated by management. One slow
evening at Anna’s, Sandra decided that her presence would not be missed and that she
would like to go home. However, she did not want to offend Fred. On the other hand,
Fred, who earnestly maintained that he would have not have asked anyone to leave, did
not mind reducing his labor costs. Neither Sandra nor Fred wanted to offend the other.
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but the negotiation context had changed, and they subsequently could benefit from a
renegotiation of the schedule. By gingerly approaching the subject, they worked out an
agreement that was mutually beneficial. In doing so, they were careful to take the role o f
the other to avoid damaging their relationship.
Internal Issues
There is more to be negotiated than external issues. The working conditions are of
tremendous importance to employees and franchisees alike. There is more to any job than
its potential for income, and this is especially true in fast food restaurants where a
routinization of the labor process has depressed wages. Everything from job task
assignment to choice of radio station to the definition o f deviance must be worked out
and compromised upon. Fast food restaurants are designed with the intention of
controlling workers in the minutest detail. Much like Paules’ waitresses, fast food
employees may, depending on the negotiation context and their motivations actively
resist managerial control (1991). This is not to say that workers always are successful or
that they always attempt to expand their autonomy. Nonetheless, sometimes through a
process of implicit or explicit negotiation, workers may increase their autonomy, and
subsequently gain control o f their working conditions. This section will be divided into
three parts. One section will consider the general working conditions o f the restaurant,
which involves any legitimate issue that may be negotiated in the restaurant. Another
section will consider the negotiations over the definition o f deviance. First, we will
examine how autonomy relates to negotiations over internal issues.
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Worker Autonomy and Negotiation
Over Internal Issues
The rationalized labor process requires the tight control o f employees. There is a
correct way of doing things. Management at Grinders and Anna’s did not attempt to
achieve the totality o f control that has been reported by other ethnographers (Garson
1988, Reiter 1991, Leidner 1993). Neither James nor Fred are particularly interested in
single handedly doing what requires several managers, assistant managers, and crew
trainers at larger more highly differentiated restaurants. James and Fred did not seek to
control laborers arbitrarily. Both Franchisees were willing to be lax on a number o f
issues. Their largest concern was that the customers were satisfied. Neither franchisee
required his employees to wear an elaborate uniform. There were no nametags or work
issue pants. Workers at Grinders and Aima’s were not expected to engage in the highly
unpopular practice o f “suggestive selling” (Leidner 1993:139).
Employees will usually have to increase their autonomy to make the job conditions fit
their desires. At a Grinders restaurant where I was employed before my time with James,
my employer seemed happy to allow me to use the telephone or do my school work
during slow periods. I presume that his reasoning was, in part, to encourage me to remain
at the restaurant, and because it was cheaper to allow these indulgences than it was to pay
a higher wage. Many times employee gains in autonomy seem to come at the expense of
material gains. Employers may compensate for the low wages by allowing favored
workers increased freedom. The degree to which workers are free is an important
component of the social order o f the restaurant. Worker autonomy is always subject to
negotiation and as will be seen later is connected to negotiations over the job conditions.
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Issues such as the definition o f deviance, which workers will perform what tasks, and
which radio stations can be played, are all aspects o f the job conditions that are directly
related to how free workers are from employer control.
General Conditions
On any given day, innumerable issues may be the subjects o f implicit or explicit
negotiation. These issues may be relatively benign such as who will take their break first
or something far more controversial such as whom will clean the toilet. While these
issues do not directly affect an employee outside o f the restaurant, they take on a great
deal of significance within the milieu. As with the external issues, negotiations over the
general working conditions may lead some employees to come into conflict with each
other or with the franchisee. Conversely, negotiations over other issues may be
cooperative.
The Radio
One issue of potential significance is the choice o f radio station. Working in a fast
food restaurant may provide few opportunities for enjoyable stimuli. The work can be
hectic, the hours long, and the public unforgiving. One area that may greatly improve
working conditions is the radio. Use o f the radio is one of the issues o f negotiation
identified by Morgan in his study o f the negotiated order o f the factory (1975). When I
was first hired at a certain Grinders restaurant (years before working for James) there
were specific rules governing which radio stations were acceptable and which were
unacceptable. Unfortunately for me, the radio station that I had grown accustomed to at a
previous Grinders owned by a different franchisee was specifically off limits at this
location. I was a recent addition in an industry that is renowned for its high turnover rate.
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I was a periphery member o f the crew and subsequently my negotiating position was
relatively weak. I suffered through a winter o f dance pop. However, a few months later. I
had proven myself a reliable employee and some o f the other core members had left the
restaurant. My bargaining position had improved vastly, because my leaving would have
caused hardship to the manager who controlled the radio (if I resigned this manager
would have been forced to cover my night shift until a replacement could be found and
trained). One day, I asked the manager, who had been upholding the ban on my favorite
station, if I could change the radio station. We worked out an arrangement where I could
listen to whatever station I wanted to after he had left for the day. This is significant in
that it shows that a non-managerial employee may be able to increase his autonomy in the
restaurant in a highly regulated system.
The radio was not a divisive issue at Anna’s largely because the actors cooperated
with each other. Fred set the guidelines o f what was and what not acceptable. For
instance, hard rock was not an acceptable option during the day. Employees negotiated
within the parameters set by Fred. I asked Dianne, “Who decides the radio station?” She
replied:
Fred’s wife. When she goes we work it out. I don’t want
rap or heavy metal. I don’t mind the more contemporary
stuff if they don’t mind my playing oldies once in a while.
The employees were able to negotiate with each other within guidelines established
by Fred and Cary. I witnessed a very even give and take. During my observations, I
listened to oldies, country, and contemporary adult. At Anna’s the choice o f radio station
was an example of how employees and franchisees may explicitly negotiate an element
of their shared existence.
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Effort
Given the popular portrayal o f the fast food restaurant, one might imagine that
workers are locked into Chaplinesque world of timers, buzzers, industrial sized spatulas
and savagely effective deep fryers. Reiter uses the Charlie Chaplin film. Modern Times,
as an analogy to fast food work, concluding, “thanks, to employment standards
legislation, most workers can stop their work to have lunch, in almost every other way,
Chaplin’s vision o f a highly controlled workplace has been realized” (1991:111).
However, the popular image o f the fast food restaurant that is portrayed by Reiter (1991)
neglects the long periods o f downtime in many restaurants and the difficulty those
employers sometimes have in fully extracting the labor power from recalcitrant
employees. According to the Tayloristic logic o f business management, the worker
should be as productive as possible. That means that every paid moment o f a worker’s
day should in some way be spent in service to the restaurant (Braverman 1974; Reiter
1991). No doubt countless fast food workers have come across a manager or a franchisee
who has uttered the words “If there’s time to lean there’s time to clean.” In my
experiences and observations, it is difficult for management to implement this maxim.
With the possible exception o f a severely depressed economy, an employer will have a
great deal o f trouble attempting to be a ‘slave driver’ o f workers who are being paid
minimum wage. Employees ‘slack o ff when there are no customers. Workers who are
slacking o ff may eat, smoke, read, or speak with each other. Many workers reject
managerial attempts to make every second productive. One former co-worker responded
to the “time to lean” dictum with one o f his own, “Minimum wage means minimum
effort.” Some franchisees may feel that because they are offering comparatively low-
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levels of remuneration, they cannot ethically or consistently (that is without losing
employees) extract a maximum expenditure sustained effort on the part o f employees.
Fred, who once was a manager in a large highly Taylorized firm, said that he enjoyed
the autonomy o f being an employer, because he had the ability to let up on his
employees, a luxury that he did not have as a manager. As the owner, he had the choice
to not to push his workers every second o f their shift, as long as the customers were
attended to. Fred explained:
They can goof off a little bit, but when people come in,
they have to be taken care of. People have this image of
fast food. They don’t want to wait.
A factor of the negotiation context is that Fred’s emotional and ethical distaste for
working his workers too hard. He spent a great deal o f time at his restaurant, which
reduced the autonomy o f his employees significantly. The employees at Anna’s did not
have the option of remaining idle for long stretches of time, even if there were no
customers. When the restaurant slowed down, Fred would have the employees clean the
restaurant.
Employees are also interested in the effort expended by their co-workers.
Ethnographers have observed how what might be termed ‘peer pressure’ is used to
encourage workers to perform effectively. Leidner (1993) writes, “it seemed to me that
most workers did conceive o f the work as a team effort and were loath to be seen by their
peers as making extra work for other people by not doing their share (p. 77). As may
easily be imagined, the workload at a restaurant is largely uncontrolled by employees. If
one employee is not effective, the other employees are expected to ‘pick up the slack’ so
to speak. Harmed employees may levy sanctions in the form o f jokes or complaints or
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even retaliatory slacking. At Grinders, a few employees (Juanita, Shawn, and I) would
rotate as the primary closers (often the most senior closer would be in charge o f the
closing procedure). The two workers who closed the restaurant had a set amount o f tasks
to complete before they could leave. If an employee working in the afternoon failed to
work effectively, the lack o f effort would have repercussions for those who had to close
after the offending worker had left. A worker who continually leaves his or her
coworkers in a bad position may find that they return the favor when it is her or his turn
to close the restaurant. One evening, I was scheduled to close and Shawn was scheduled
to leave a few hours before closing, Shawn related that he was working hard for me
because I had worked hard for him the previous day. One could speculate that if I had not
worked well for him he would be less inclined to work well for me. Employees at
Grinders continually negotiate an agreement to work competently, in part so that no one
will be purposely left with an inordinate amount o f work to do.
Visitors
One issue that may arise during periods o f “down time” is if workers are allowed to
accept personal visitors. One may assume that the worker is placed in a deeply
regimented environment where there is little time for social interaction amongst
crewmembers, much less between a crewmember and his or her family and friends. First,
we have to consider the motivations o f the employees. With some exceptions, the
crewmembers at Grinders did not seem to want to be interested in receiving visitors. So
receiving visitors was not an issue.
At Anna’s, Sandra would occasionally receive visits from family members. Typically,
they would chat for a few minutes and then she would return to work. Sometimes she
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would intermittently wait on customers. Fred allowed her to receive visitors in part
because she had proven herself a valuable employee. Moreover, the brief visits did not
interfere with her ability to perform her job tasks. By continually demonstrating her
competence, Sandra implicitly negotiated for the right to have visitors, thus increasing
her autonomy. Although this is a relatively small issue, the fact that Sandra was able to
receive visitors reveals how workers, in some negotiation contexts, may be able to
increase their autonomy, should they want to.
Job Task Assignment
In fast food restaurants with a high division o f labor all o f the tasks such as food
preparation, cleaning, and serving have been broken down to the point where a number o f
workers can perform highly specific tasks. At this type o f restaurant, a manager will
assign crewmembers to various tasks. Reiter describes this type o f arrangement in some
detail (1991). Although the potential for this degree o f rationalization exists at both
Grinders and Anna’s, as a rule, neither restaurant employed enough workers to operate in
that manner. On occasion, Kiran and Fred would assign job tasks. However, the
fi-anchisees rarely assigned jobs, and when they did it was usually on a slow day where
workers would have difficulty deciding what (if anything) to do without direction. More
often, employees were left to decide amongst themselves who would do which jobs.
Workers were not directed in large part, because with the exception of neophyte
employees, everyone knew what needed to be done. Employees would negotiate
implicitly and explicitly for various tasks. Many employees had preferences for some job
tasks and an aversion to others. An employee might implicitly negotiate for a task by
simply beginning the task. In these circumstances, core members had an advantage
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because they possessed the cultural knowledge o f when was the optimum time to begin a
task. At Grinders, Shawn and Maria would frequently begin work on food preparation as
soon as the lunch rush tapered off. They were able to use their experience to implicitly
claim desired job tasks. Periphery members who had not obtained the specific cultural
capital to challenge the claims o f the core members had little choice but to find an
alternative task. Workers who dislike a certain task may claim the unwanted task as ‘off
limits.’ For example, one afternoon Maria announced, “My name is Mar-i-a and I don’t
clean bathrooms.” Maria was a core member o f the crew and could decide not to perform
some job tasks, because she was able to perform other tasks competently. In order to get
through the day more smoothly, employees who were not officially managers may assign
tasks to peripheral crewmembers. For instance, the first time we closed Grinders together,
Shawn who was very adept at closing the restaurant told me what tasks to do and when to
do them. I accepted his authority as legitimate despite the absence o f a formal managerial
title, because it was to our mutual benefit to close the restaurant as efficiently as possible.
At Anna’s, Sandra and Diane, who had spent a great deal o f time working together,
would alternate job tasks. As customers came in one would make desserts and the other
would make lunch items. One would go to the drive though window and the other would
go the register. They had learned how to negotiate the social order by simply reacting to
each other.
Unacceptable and Acceptable Deviance
Fast food restaurants are based on Taylor’s scientific management, which strictly
delineates what constitutes proper workplace behavior. Ideally, the franchisor is not
simply selling a name and national advertising; rather it is selling an entire formula for a
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business. The logic o f the franchise is that a web o f semi-independent entrepreneurs each
operates their restaurants according to similar principles. Many customers are attracted to
the predictability offered by franchised restaurants (Ritzer 1993). Therefore, in theory,
franchises have one correct way of doing things. However, there are situations when
employees and even franchisees may find it in their best individual interests to deviate
from the plan. In doing so, they must renegotiate the meaning o f deviance. Consequently,
a new definition o f deviance may emerge. When negotiations are unsuccessful, the social
order is damaged, often with an employee’s tenure being terminated.
Deviance may take on a number of different forms. There is acceptable deviance and
unacceptable deviance. Acceptable deviance includes all behaviors that deviate from the
official way o f doing things but are not considered deviant in the actual practice of
everyday life. Unacceptable deviance includes all behaviors that deviate from the
workplace norms. Unacceptable deviance includes actions that, if discovered, would
require sanctioning (usually dismissal or resignation). The ongoing negotiations over
deviance generally involve whether a behavior is defined as acceptable deviance or
unacceptable deviance. There are different types o f deviance. There is procedural
deviance when the franchisee or the crewmembers perform a given job task in a way that
differs from the written proscription. There is deviance from the established work place
norms. These behaviors would include giving food away, or not showing up for a
scheduled shift. This section will focus on negotiations over which behavior is acceptable
and what is unacceptable. Behaviors that are unacceptable beyond the pale o f negotiation
(such as giving away food) need not be considered here.
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The franchisor, the franchisee, regulatory agencies, employees, and customers each
have an interest in the definition of deviance. While many actors, play a role in defining
deviance the franchisee and the employees are the ones who must act with or against the
existing norms. The franchisee was often placed in a position of having to enforce
regulations that were not of his or her making but could be damaging if ignored by the
crewmembers. The franchisee must also tailor the general regulations to the specific
location. Some rules may or may not be appropriate to the specific situation. The
franchisee must attempt to communicate the definition o f deviance to the crewmembers.
In general, the franchisee is the one who sanctions the employees. The sanctions
generally include reduced hours, reduced autonomy, or termination o f employment. The
franchisee’s ability to dismiss employees gives him or her the right to define what
constitutes deviant behavior. Employees are not powerless in their negotiations.
Employees can interpret their situation and choose to follow a deviant practice if they
believe they will not be discovered, that they are not worried about being terminated, or
that the negotiation context is such that it would be unwise for the franchisee to sanction
them for a given act. Their actions may take the form o f implicit negotiations if they
choose to act in a deviant manner despite the fact that they will most likely be discovered.
In actually having to follow the rules, franchisees and employees may choose to
accept or attempt to renegotiate the imposed order. Depending on their motivations, the
franchisee and the crewmembers may or may not be brought into conflict or cooperation
over whether or not a given practice is deviant. Oftentimes both the franchisee and
employees have little difficulty following the rules that have been set for them without
deviation. At Grinders, the franchisor has devised a formula for making sandwiches. For
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the franchisor to impose a different policy or for an employee to experiment with
radically different bread slicing techniques, would constitute deviant behavior. Neither
the franchisee nor the employees had any reason to reject the rules about bread slicing.
As Leidner reported, routinization is not intrinsically problematic (1993).
However, there were a number o f official rules that are inconvenient to either the
franchisee or the crewmembers. When the original rules do not benefit the franchisee, he
or she may decide not to transmit these rules to her or his employees. The franchisee may
decide to work out the rules on an individual basis, keeping one set o f rules for some
employees and a different set o f rales for others. At Grinders, there is a specific formula
for preparing all o f the menu items. The rales prescribe the number o f tomatoes on a
large sandwich, the width o f the green peppers, and the order that items should be placed
on the sandwich. Usually, the rales are a helpful guide. Sometimes, however, the rales
are an unnecessary hindrance. For example, the manual proclaims that when making
seafood salad, the employee should measure the amount o f mayonnaise to be mixed with
the seafood salad. Kiran and James would train the periphery employees to prepare the
salad according to the written instructions. Measuring the mayonnaise seemed an
unnecessary waste o f time to most o f the people that have performed the chore more than
once. After I had been shown how to measure the mayonnaise, I noticed that none o f the
core members bothered to follow this norm. When it was my turn to make the salad, I
followed the norm that was specific to the restaurant and measured the mayonnaise by
eye. Kiran saw me and began to reprimand me.
Kiran:

Y ou are supposed to measure the mayonnaise

Eric:

I’ve been doing it like this for years. Jesus, I mess up the wraps and now I
can’t do anything right.
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Kiran:

No its ju st... we all measure by eye I forgot you have the most experience.

I explicitly negotiated for a redefinition o f what was considered deviant. I cited my
previous experience as being the basis for my claim that the practice o f forgoing the
measurement o f the mayonnaise should be acceptably deviant. I then proceeded to add
too much mayonnaise to the salad.
The negotiation context may allow workers an opportunity to redefine what forms of
deviance are acceptable and what are prohibited. In most workplaces repeatedly calling in
sick or failing to show up for a scheduled shift, even with an excuse, would be
unacceptable. Not working when scheduled is a form o f deviance that may easily lead to
dismissal. At Grinders, some workers seemed to interpret the high turnover rate at the
restaurant as providing an opportunity for them to avoid unwanted shifts without having
sanctions imposed on them. Not appearing for a scheduled shift may be an implicit
method of negotiating for a day off. Sometimes ignoring the schedule is a more effective
means of avoiding an unwanted shift than explicitly negotiating for a schedule change.
Not showing up for a shift was a common occurrence. O f the twenty shifts that I worked
at Grinders, there were eight instances o f workers not appearing for shifts that they were
scheduled to work. This is not to say that every time that a person failed to show up it
there was no ‘valid’ excuse. However, it was widely speculated that some o f the absences
were illegitimate. One frustrated crewmember exclaimed to the franchisee, “You don’t
have enough people. They know you ain’t going to fire them, so they don’t show up.”
The fact that James did not fire the employees that were suspected o f illegitimately
calling off from work supports the employee’s claims. The employees who failed to show
up had implicitly acted to push for the acceptability o f a deviant behavior that could be
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defined as unacceptable. James, in passing, mentioned that he would eventually fire the
worst offender. I suspect that he would redefine the act o f failing to show up for a shift as
unacceptable only after the negotiation context changes in such a way that would allow
him to remove certain employees without damaging his other interests.
The definition o f deviance was a far less volatile topic at Anna’s. Workers seemed to
have little motivation to redefine the behaviors or practices that are labeled as deviant by
the franchisee. Months upon months of ongoing negotiations had led to a stable definition
of acceptable and unacceptable practices. Fred was by no means a ‘slave driver’ and he
did not create rules arbitrarily. So long as the customers’ needs were met and the
restaurant’s equipment was treated properly, Fred was not interested in enforcing the
rules simply for the sake o f exercising authority. Likewise, the employees were largely
unconcerned with redefining deviance. Anna’s did provide one example of the
negotiation over deviance. Years ago, Fred did not allow employees to chew gum while
they worked. This policy was a source o f consternation amongst gum chewing
employees. They implicitly negotiated for a redefinition o f deviance by taking it upon
themselves to chew gum in a manner that would not disgust customers. Eventually, Fred
conceded the right to chew gum, so long as it was done in a tasteful manner. Fred did not
want the sight o f lip smacking, gum chewing employees to offend customers. However,
he did not have any desire to needlessly deny his employees something that might
improve their working conditions. When his core employees demonstrated that they
could avoid violating the spirit o f his policy despite deviating from the letter of the rules,
Fred accepted the implicit negotiation, providing that the employees continued to act with
respect to the customers.
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Conclusion
Through an analysis o f observations of two franchises, we may conclude that the
social order o f a restaurant is achieved, in part, through implicit and explicit negotiation.
After describing Anna’s and Grinders, I presented a generalized description of the cast of
actors in a fast food restaurant, and their relationship to the negotiation context. While
franchisees have a great deal o f power in negotiations, they also depend on the other
actors. Although, fast food jobs are designed to make employees interchangeable, core
employees may find that they can cancel negotiations more easily than their employer
can. In other words, in some contexts, core employees may have an easier time replacing
their employers than their employer would have replacing them. Employees may exploit
this feature o f the negotiation context to their benefit.
There are two types of negotiation (both external and conditions) that are subject to
the processes o f negotiation. Actors choose how to negotiate based on their interpretation
of the situation and their own proclivities. Depending on their strategy, skills and relative
power, employees may be able to achieve their goals. For instance, for the external issue
of wages, employees may negotiate implicitly by attempting to become a core member of
the restaurant or explicitly by stating he or she would like to receive. An actor may
choose to use both methods in tandem. Actors will interpret the negotiation context and
act accordingly. For instance, when Shawn avoided negotiation because of a previous
argument or when James placated me after I had worked alone during a difficult shift.
Considering the highly rationalized design o f franchised fast food restaurants, the
nature o f deviance is quite interesting. The different types o f actors have potentially
disparate interpretations o f the social norms. The high priority placed on ‘correct’ rational
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action, as well as the different positions o f actors, results in a continuous negotiation over
the definition o f deviance. There are two types o f deviant actions, acceptable and
unacceptable. When actors are able to agree that a certain behavior while technically
deviant is not harmful; it will be considered acceptably deviant. For instance, at Grinders,
employees mixed salads without actually measuring the mayonnaise as prescribed in the
Grinders operations manual. The definition o f some acts depends on the negotiation
context. For example, oftentimes employees who fail to show up for a shift are
terminated. At Grinders, the negotiation context was such that employees who failed to
appear for scheduled shifts were not sanctioned. Through implicit negotiation (not
coming to a scheduled shift), employees changed the definition o f deviance, and what
was formerly unacceptable became marginally acceptable. O f course, once the
negotiation context changes again (i.e. when labor pressures become less intense) not
appearing for scheduled shifts will again become an unacceptable act. In the next chapter,
I will summarize the findings and consider the implications for future research.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION
An analysis o f data from two fast food restaurants supports the negotiated order
perspective’s assumptions that all social order is dependent upon some form of
negotiation and those negotiations are influenced by social structure. Contrary to popular
portrayal, fast food workers are not always incapable o f meeting their ends. Despite
scientific management, the dearth o f employment options, and the myriad o f other
structural features that systematically weaken individuals in low-level food service work,
there are conditions wherein workers, may choose to increase their autonomy. Although
fast food restaurants can be viewed as the “paradigm case of the rationalization process”
(Ritzer 1993:18) workers are not simply passive tools o f a corporation’s formalized plan
of action. Fast food employees are active agents. However, their ability to reach their
goals is influenced by the subjective interpretation o f the structural forces that impinge on
the milieu. While actors often had opposed interests, their ability to reach their respective
goals usually required some cooperation with the other actors. The social order o f the
restaurant depends on the ability of the organizational members to agree to work with
each other. The notion that social order is continually achieved was demonstrated in the
analysis.
The two franchises were analyzed using the conceptual devices of the negotiated
order perspective. The salient features o f the structural and negotiation context were
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elucidated. Negotiations did not occur in a vacuum. The structural forces that affected the
workers’ attempts to reach their aims included the economy, the unemployment rate, the
number of similar jobs, the weather, the legal order, and so forth. The negotiation context
included such features as motivations, personal skills, and emotions.
The preceding analysis provided an outline o f the issues that are negotiated in a fast
food restaurant. Although the outline may not be comprehensive, most possible topics of
negotiation could be subsumed in the rubric of external issues (i.e. wages, promotion, and
scheduling) as well as internal issues (i.e. job task assignment, the definition o f deviance,
and sundry daily concerns). The process by which these issues were worked out at two
franchises has already been considered. The data drawn from observations and personal
experience are highly specific to the setting. However, the processes o f negotiation that
were observed in the restaurants have implications for the sociological understanding o f
fast food restaurants, the nature of autonomy in regulated enviromnents, the negotiated
order perspective, and the interplay between structure and individual agency.
Fast Food Restaurants
Using the negotiated order perspective yields an improvement in our understanding of
fast food restaurants. The ethnographies o f fast food restaurants provide a sort o f natural
experiment, wherein we may begin to speculate about how different structural conditions
may lead to differences in the lived experiences o f workers. This study demonstrates a
number of features o f fast food restaurants. The findings include the need for a typology
o f fast food restaurants, the differences between core and periphery employees, a
typology o f negotiated issues, and the limits of autonomy in fast food restaurants.
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More than McDonald’s
Ethnographies and journalistic accounts o f fast food restaurants have focused on
McDonald’s or similarly designed franchises. There is a pronounced tendency to conflate
McDonald’s restaurants with the entire fast food industry. There is diversity amongst the
fast food restaurants that use scientific management to control the labor process. Fast
food restaurants that are unlike McDonald’s restaurants are not simply deviations from a
statistical mean. There are thousands o f franchised fast food restaurants that are
significantly less differentiated than McDonald’s, offer different menu items, are fewer in
number, and have different franchising arrangements, (Eberts and Gisler 1989; Jakle and
Sculle 1999; Schlosser 2001). Even though McDonald’s and similar restaurants have
received the bulk o f the attention in ethnographic and journalistic accounts o f fast food
restaurants, there are many workers that are in similar (pay, prestige) positions who have
significantly different lived experiences at their respective jobs. The creation of a
typology o f franchised fast food restaurants exceeds the scope o f this study. However, the
data presented here point to the diversity o f structure in fast food restaurants.
This variety o f structural conditions may allow for drastic differences in the lived
experiences o f workers. A comparison o f this study with ethnographic accounts o f
McDonald’s and Burger King might lead us to the following speculations (Reiter 1991;
Leidner 1993; Royle 2000). A relatively simple division o f labor may allow workers to
deal more directly with their employer. The fewer the levels o f management the easier it
may be for workers to negotiate with their employer directly rather than a manager or
assistant manager. A franchisee has far more autonomy than a manager does. A
franchisee has the authority to change the work environment while a manager has a
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prescribed authority. However, a franchisee may also have a greater personal stake in the
given negotiation than a manager will. The outcome o f employee-management
negotiations is partially influenced by the division o f labor and the depth of the hierarchy.
However, this influence is not likely to be uniform.
Issues to be Negotiated
Additionally, this study adds to the existing studies o f negotiated order in rationalized
environments by creating a typology o f issues that are subject to negotiation in the
workplace. Issues that are subject to negotiation are o f two general types. The first type
o f issue includes all external issues that are directly related to an employee’s nor-work
life. External issues include but may not be confined to remuneration, scheduling,
promotion, and job security. The second general type o f issues to be negotiated are
internal issues job that affect an employee during the working day, such as the definition
o f deviance or the control of the labor process. Any researcher analyzing a rationalized
workplace with the negotiated order perspective may employ this typology.
Core and Periphery Employees
In a highly rationalized environment, workers who share similar formal positions will
have different places in the organization. This study further elucidates an observation by
Leidner (1993) that core employees will have different experiences than other workers.
There are two general types of employees. Some fast food employees form the core o f the
work crew while others lie along the periphery. There is often a difference between core
and periphery employees in terms of differential ends and means. The data show a
patterned relationship between an employee’s status (core or periphery) and what they
may hope to achieve for themselves. Core employees will have a slightly different set of
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possible goals than periphery employees, as well as a different repertoire o f possible
means to attain those goals. One’s status as a core or periphery employee is hardly static.
An individual may find that one status may work for a specific set o f goals, but a change
in status may be required if the worker’s goals should change. A worker who wants to
work part-time and would like to minimize his or her responsibility may find that a high
autonomy periphery status and the expectations that go with that are adequate for his
needs. However, if that same worker finds that she or he needs to increase his earnings
due to a change in his personal circumstances (such as tuition or new lodgings) she or he
may negotiate for a wage raise by actively becoming a core member of the group. The
terms core and periphery are neither clear nor distinct. They relate to a relative status
within the group as opposed to a formally defined position. A person may be more or less
core or periphery to the group. There is a fluid continuum between core and periphery.
An employee may move from the periphery to the core and back again. A core employee
may move even closer to the core. Either type o f employee can leave suddenly, however
a periphery employee will be far more likely to leave than will a core employee.
The Unstable Nature o f Fast Food Employment
The restaurants that were observed were marked by their relative instability.
Unskilled fast food employees are easily replaced and therefore less powerful (Reiter
1991). Fast food work exemplifies the deskilling o f the labor force (Ritzer 1998). In as
much as fast food labor has been deskilled so that workers have become replaceable,
there are now such a multitude o f fast food restaurants, each offering a similar lack of
security, benefits, training, prestige, and wages that employers have become as
replaceable as their deskilled employees. Instability is a structural component even in the
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most harmonious restaurant. Reiter relates that disgruntled employees may oiten choose
to “vote with their feet” (1991:155). The ease with which franchisees may be replaced
may play a role in franchisees being as attentive as possible to ‘reasonable’ employee
demands. As Fred explained, “If someone wants a day off I just give it to him. Otherwise,
he could be at Burger King next week.” Although franchisees hold ultimate authority
over how much autonomy their employees have or who will remain employed at the
restaurant they must make some concessions to their employees are to be retained. The
absence of a contract and the relative ease with which employees and employers may end
the relationship play a large role in workplace negotiations. As Strauss notes, ‘‘'options to
avoiding or discontinuing negotiation” are an important variable in the negotiation
context (emphasis in original) (1978:100). Employees or employers in fast food
restaurants may be more or less willing to make concessions during a conflict over a
specific issue depending on their interpretation o f the ease with which the other could be
replaced. Some structural conditions may allow workers to have far more power than
usually ascribed to them in literature.
Autonomy in Regulated Environments
Differences in structure may have implications for our understanding of scientific
management. Scientific management seeks to control workers thus reducing their
autonomy. Reiter has described how McDonald’s has succeeded in applying Taylorism to
the restaurant (1991). The high degree o f regulation required by scientific management
cannot be accomplished without a significant outlay o f resources. The computers and
other labor saving devices require investments o f capital that is assumedly not available
to all potential franchisees. Some restaurant owners make far less use o f technology and
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laborers than do others. Within the rubric o f fast food, there are a number o f restaurateurs
who employ scientific management, but not to the degree to which McDonald’s has been
able to do so. Grinders and Ana’s represent two such restaurants. Both employ scientific
management to bring about a formally rational plan o f action. However, neither have the
resources to coerce workers to act as closely to the model, as McDonald’s. The absence
of capital investment in scientific management presents a structural contribution to the
ability o f employees to increase their personal autonomy. To the extent, that employers
fail to deskill laborers, employers must depend on the abilities of their employees
(Braverman 1974). Although, Anna’s and Grinders have a formally rational way o f
performing most tasks, workers in both restaurants are under less o f a structural
obligation to follow the prescriptions exactly. In other words, an absence o f capital
investment in differentiation and technology can increase potential autonomy. This
finding would partially explain why the employees at Grinders and Anna’s possessed
more autonomy than did employees at the restaurants studied by Garson (1988) and
Reiter (1991). Workers who seek to increase their autonomy do so through a process of
negotiation. Franchisees do not simply grant autonomy because they do not have the
means to control workers. They often make demands that are similar to their counter
parts in capital-intensive restaurants. However, franchisees at less structurally
differentiated restaurants will be more likely to concede autonomy to workers that
implicitly or explicitly push for greater autonomy. O f course, the degree o f autonomy
afforded to individual laborers is subject to continual processes o f negotiation.
The data suggest that autonomy may become a bargaining piece in employeeemployer negotiations. Workers may seek to exploit structural features such as a labor
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shortage or high turnover by negotiating for increased autonomy. Workers, who are not
interested in a minimal wage increase, might try to avoid undesired job tasks (i.e. I don’t
clean toilets”) or controlling their availability (i.e. refusing to work weekends or
evenings). However, if this worker wishes to earn more money, either through promotion
or increased hours, the worker may negotiate for this end by sacrificing autonomy. An
employee who was previously unwilling to work nights or weekends may find himself
closing the restaurant on a Saturday night. Likewise, employers may concede increases in
autonomy once employees have reached the limits o f what he or she will pay in wages.
Fast food restaurants are based on paying employees low wages. Oftentimes, workers
will leave their position when they are able to earn higher wages elsewhere (Chamer and
Fraser 1984). Employers may find that certain employees are more valuable than what he
or she can afford to spend. An employer may negotiate to retain an employee by offering
increased autonomy in place o f higher wages. For instance, an employer may allow a
core employee to set his or her schedule, avoid unwanted job tasks, choose the radio
station, receive visitors, or use the telephone. An employee may accept an increase in
autonomy in place o f an increase in wages. In short, we may observe an exchange of
autonomy for financial compensation in the fast food restaurants.
Negotiations o f Social Order
The findings o f this study go beyond conclusions about fast food restaurants. The data
support and add to the negotiated order perspective, consequently, leading to a better
understanding o f social order and how it is achieved through interaction. The data allow
us to come closer to an understanding o f the interplay between agency and social
structure as well as rationalization and autonomy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

119

As stated previously, the assumptions o f the negotiated order perspective are that
social order depends on negotiation, social structure influences negotiations, negotiations
must be continually renewed in response to structural changes, and negotiations are
impermanent (Fine 1996:3-4). The data support these assumptions. In the highly unstable
world o f the fast food restaurant employees may resign or be terminated with little
advance notice. It is not unusual for, both the employee and employer to be capable of
replacing the other. However, all things being equal it is frequently easier to continue a
business relationship than to find a new job or train a new employee respectively.
Therefore, employees and employers have incentive to maintain the relationship; in spite
of the conflict that is an intrinsic component o f their relationship. Employees and
employers cooperate with each other through the process o f negotiation. This cooperation
is not created in a vacuum. The second assumption o f the negotiated order perspective is
that structural features influence negotiations. The data show that the negotiations
between different parties in a fast food restaurant are far from equal. Employers are far
more powerful than are their employees. Although, employers depend on their
employees, the ability of the employer to dismiss employees and set the terms of
employment stacks the proverbial cards firmly in favor o f the house. The power that
employers wield is dependent upon structural variables that are subject to change. The
third and fourth assumptions of the negotiated order perspective are supported by the
observation that as the structural context o f the restaurant changes the social order must
be renegotiated. A change in the unemployment rate, the number of similar restaurants in
the area, the building of a new road, demographic shifts, and so on may influence the
power that workers and franchisees possess relative to each other. For example, in this
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study, factors that led to an increase in the number of customers often necessitated a
renegotiation of the social order. The holiday that caused a drastic increase in business
resulted in a number o f negotiations o f the social order at Grinders.
This study supports many o f the conclusions of Morgan who applied the negotiated
order perspective to the analysis o f a factory (1975). Unlike many studies o f negotiated
order, Morgan examined a highly regulated setting. He found that negotiation is present
even in organizations where some actors have little power in relation to others. Morgan
argues that negotiation may be either implicit or explicit (1975). This study expands upon
Morgan’s research by applying many o f his findings to the analysis o f fast food
restaurants. Fast food restaurants, like factories, are subject to the process of
rationalization, which has systematically reduced the power and autonomy of lower level
workers. As in Morgan’s factory, particular issues may be negotiated implicitly or
explicitly (1975). This study supports Morgan’s observation that even the most formally
rational organizations rely on negotiation to accomplish social order. From this research,
we cannot go so far as to claim that all social orders are maintained through negotiation.
For instance, the findings of this research may not be applicable to “sweat shops,” or
internment camps. Although Erving Goffinan’s, Asylums, certainly points to the
possibility that processes o f negotiation contribute to the maintenance o f even the most
repressive social orders (1961). We might speculate that in any organization where
persons in power depend on the cooperation of subordinates (particularly subordinates
who may for one reason or another be capable of choosing to leave the organization) the
social order will be maintained, in part, through processes o f negotiation.
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The Imprecise Nature o f Implicit Negotiation
This study adds to Morgan’s research in a number of ways. In highly controlled
environments, low-level workers may engage in implicit negotiations when explicit
negotiation is unfeasible. Morgan treats implicit negotiation as if it is conducted for
specific aims such as control o f time. While some forms o f implicit negotiation may be
conducted for specific issues, many times, implicit negotiations include actions that place
persons in a position to demand different sets o f issues. For instance, the employee who
actively moves from a periphery to core status within the restaurant may be implicitly
negotiating for a set of issues (i.e. increased pay or increased authority). From this
finding, we may surmise that negotiations may occur in various stages. The imprecise
implicit type o f negotiation is typified by an employee who actively attempts to move
from the periphery to the core, can be interpreted as a base level interpretation that places
an actor in a position that allows her or him to make more precise negotiations. The
employee who succeeds in becoming a core employee is in a better position to negotiate
for increased wages or greater influence over the schedule. The movement fi-om
periphery to core status is an act o f negotiation, as it requires the individual to provide
certain bargaining pieces (i.e. effort and responsibility) in exchange for an
intersubjectively held understanding that a person is a part o f the core o f the group.
Status and Autonomy in Negotiations
An employee’s level o f autonomy and status (as a periphery or core member) will
influence which aims the employee can hope to reach. Status and autonomy are two
variable axes that an employee may wish to alter in order to reach different sets of goals.
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The imprecise negotiation process can be illustrated by imaging the lived experience of
two hypothetical employees.
Employee A begins her career at the restaurant as a periphery member with low
autonomy. She exercises little influence issues that are negotiated because neither the
crew nor the franchisee has come to depend on her. Employee A, in an effort to earn
more money, does not push for greater autonomy (control o f the schedule or job task
assignment) rather she negotiates for increased wages and hours by working hard and
efficaciously. After Employee A has attained what she interprets as the limits o f her
wages, she may use her core status to negotiate for increased autonomy. She may place
limitations on her scheduling availability or what job tasks she will perform. The
franchisee accepts these demands because he is not willing to pay her a higher wage, but
he does not want her to resign.
Employee B has an opposite experience in the negotiations. Like Employee A,
Employee B begins as a peripheral member with little autonomy. He is more interested in
maintaining a balance between his personal life and his work life. As he becomes a core
member, he negotiates for increased autonomy by placing limitations on which shifts he
will accept. Because, he would be difficult to replace, the franchisee often accepts his
scheduling limitations. However, should Employee B decide that he would like to
increase his income; he may sacrifice his autonomy by decreasing his limitations on
availability in exchange for more hours per week. O f course, these examples are
oversimplifications. They are used to demonstrate the interplay between employee status
and autonomy in the negotiated order o f a fast food restaurant.
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Individual Agency and Social Structure
The negotiated order perspective can allow us to obtain a greater understanding
of the relationship between individual agency and social structure. The data support the
notion that social structure does not have a uniform affect on actors (Sugrue 1982;
Altheide 1988). Rational individuals interpret their social environment before they
choose to act. Two individuals may view the same job market quite differently. Of
course, the interpretation of reality is not subject to purely rational processes. One’s
interpretation of reality will undoubtedly be affected by one’s emotions or values.
Additionally, we may conclude that social structure is impermanent. The structure must
be continually renegotiated, cooperation is achieved through a process o f continual
negotiation, individual motivations change, actors come, and go, and the definition of
deviance is reworked. Social structure arises from interaction. Moreover, I have found
that while the social structure will place limits on one’s agency, individuals are still
capable o f maneuvering through the structure. Some individuals are able to exploit their
own abilities to manipulate the social structure to their personal advantage, while other,
less efficacious individuals will fail to achieve their desires.’
Lastly, this study allows us to come to a greater understanding o f how the process o f
rationalization or as Ritzer (1993) has put it McDonaldization plays out in the lives of
individuals. The act o f calculating a single best way o f performing a specific task
significantly reduces the autonomy o f workers (Weber [1930] 1997; Braverman 1974;
Ritzer 1998). This study does not dispute the fact that the process o f rationalization has
steadily decreased the autonomy o f employees. However, at a micro level, a formally

' Demographic characteristics such as race, gender, and age will affect on the negotiation context.
However, the nature and extent o f these variables exceeds the scope o f this study.
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rational plan may take on a different significance in the lives o f individuals. By using the
negotiated order perspective to examine specific formally rational workplaces, we may
find that rationalization is not uniformly problematic for workers. In some instances,
individual autonomy is far from ideal. Given the choice between autonomy and security,
many workers will sacrifice autonomy. The freedom from control of the labor process
may not benefit an employee who wants to expend as little energy as possible when at
work (Leidner 1993). The employer who is less interested in controlling the labor process
may be creating more work for employees who have to compensate for the lack o f
routinization with their own effort. The process o f having to interpret a single best way to
negotiate a chaotic situation may be allow for greater autonomy and greater
dissatisfaction on the part of the worker. However, there are times when an employee
may want to increase his or her autonomy. The ability to receive visitors, choose the
radio station, decide when to take a break, set one’s schedule, eschew certain job tasks, or
any of the other issues that may be negotiated in a restaurant will depend on the
existential actor. By using the negotiated order perspective that accounts for contextual
factors, we may come to understand how individuals negotiate for their existentially held
motivations. We may come to see how and when workers may strive to increase their
autonomy, likewise we may discem situations where freedom is problematic.
Future Research
Future studies o f negotiated order or fast food research may move in a number of
directions from here. This study did not examine highly differentiated fast food
restaurants. Will workers have an easier time negotiating with managers or the owner?
Will the increase in differentiation completely reduce worker autonomy by narrowing job
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tasks thus further controlling the labor process? Does an increase crew size reduce the
ability of management to supenhse workers, thereby creating a structural potential for
increased autonomy? The increase in structural complexity will certainly alter the
negotiation context, yet without empirical data we may only speculate as to how."
Likewise, future researchers of the negotiated order perspective may focus on franchisees
and their web o f negotiations with their employees, property owners, suppliers,
regulators, franchisor, and customers. Moreover, taking direction from Denzin’s analysis
of the liquor industry one could study the various levels o f society where the social order
o f the fast food restaurants is maintained through negotiation (1977, 1978a). For
negotiated order theorists, the data point to the importance o f examining highly regulated
milieus. Future studies o f the disenfranchised may illustrate how individuals with little
power achieve or fail to achieve their goals (prison inmates, welfare recipients, or sales
clerks) through negotiation. These studies may improve the negotiated order perspective
by adding to analytical concepts and strengthening existing sensitizing concepts such as
implicit negotiation. Additional studies o f the negotiated order perspective may
incrementally develop a theory of negotiations, which, in turn, may allow sociologists to
better understand the interplay between agency and structure.

■ The data presented by Reiter (1991). Leidner (1993), and Royle (2001 ) when compared with this study
would lead us to believe that an increase in the division o f labor reduces the autonomy o f workers.
However, we could be far more certain with an analysis o f highly specialized restaurants from the
negotiated order perspective.
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